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Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

Author

Listed:
  • Tun Lin

    (Department of Economics, University of Cambridge)

  • Timo Goeschl

    (Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge)

Abstract

This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored. We discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.

Suggested Citation

  • Tun Lin & Timo Goeschl, 2004. "Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices," Working Papers 2004.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.55
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Arguedas, C. & Meijerink, Gerdien W. & van Soest, Daan P., 2008. "Green payment programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44320, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Carmen Arguedas & Daan Soest, 2011. "Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 305-323, October.
    3. Francisco Alpízar & Anna Nordén & Alexander Pfaff & Juan Robalino, 2017. "Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(1), pages 181-202, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Biodiversity conservation; Information; Regulatory tools;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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