Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property
This article constructs an economic model of government takings in which some property owners develop their land earlier than others. Because it is efficient for the government to "take" undeveloped land before developed land, uncompensated takings will give landowners an incentive to develop their property early in order to reduce the risk of government appropriation. This overdevelopment incentive can be countered, and efficiency thereby restored, if landowners are appropriately compensated when their property is taken, or if "equal treatment" is afforded to owners of developed and undeveloped land. However, when the government responds to political pressure, a judicial compensation requirement will often lead to less government land use regulation than is efficient. In contrast, a judicial equal treatment requirement can elicit efficient development and regulatory decisions. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baxter, William F & Altree, Lillian R, 1972. "Legal Aspects of Airport Noise," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 1-113, April.
- Farber, Daniel A., 1992. "Economic analysis and just compensation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-138, June.
- Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
- Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
- Paul Burrows, 1991. "Compensation for Compulsory Acquisition," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(1), pages 49-63.
- James C. Ohls & David Pines, 1975. "Discontinuous Urban Development and Economic Efficiency," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 51(3), pages 224-234.
- Mills, David E., 1980. "Transferable development rights markets," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 63-74, January.
- Riddiough, Timothy J., 1997. "The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Taking Risk on Land Value and Development Activity," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 56-77, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:40:y:1997:i:2:p:403-32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.