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Takings of Land by Self-interested Governments Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain

Author

Listed:
  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer

    (Bucerius Law School, Hamburg)

  • Ram Singh

    (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics)

Abstract

In this paper, we model and examine the effects of two salient features of the eminent domain law and its use. First, the compensation is less than ‘full’. Second, the government is not a perfect agent of the society. Once these features are factored in, several claims in the existing literature do not hold. Our results question the ‘fiscal-illusion’ theory. We show that the full compensation ensures efficiency neither of the takings nor of the investment decisions. Moreover, things can get worse with tightening of the budget constraints. However, under-compensation combined with the provision of restitution delivers a better outcome - in terms of investment choices by the owners as well as the taking decisions and project choices by the government. Further, we show that fixed-compensation schemes generally are not efficient even if the government is benevolent, but under-compensation can still deliver outcome more efficient than the full compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2017. "Takings of Land by Self-interested Governments Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Working papers 281, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:281
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    1. Ram Singh, 2019. "Kaushik Basu: The republic of beliefs: A new approach to law and economics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 371-380, December.

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