An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain
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- Glaeser, Edward L. & Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2016.
"Securing Property Rights,"
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- repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:6:p:1365-98 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Laura Rae Dove, 2016. "Introducing the Moral Foundations of Capitalism in Undergraduate Business Law and Ethics Courses Using Kelo v. City of New London," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 87-95.
- Paul F. Byrne, 2017. "Have Post-Kelo Restrictions on Eminent Domain Influenced State Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 31(1), pages 81-91, February.
- Colwell, Peter F. & Munneke, Henry J., 1997. "The Structure of Urban Land Prices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
- Romain MELOT, 2012. "Conflicts over compensation of expropriation. The case of farmland in France," ERSA conference papers ersa12p458, European Regional Science Association.
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- Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2017. "Takings of Land by Self-interested Governments Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Working papers 281, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Daniel Göller & Michael Hewer, 2014. "Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: The Bilateral Investment Case," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(3), pages 520-536, September.
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- Casey B. Mulligan, 2015. "In-Kind Taxes, Behavior, and Comparative Advantage," NBER Working Papers 21586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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