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An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Ram Singh, 2018. "Takings of Land by Self-Interested Governments: Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 427-459.
  2. Gerard H Dericks & Hans R A Koster, 2021. "The billion pound drop: the Blitz and agglomeration economies in London [The economics of density: evidence from the Berlin wall]," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(6), pages 869-897.
  3. Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew, 2024. "Courts, legislatures, and evolving property rules: Lessons from eminent domain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  4. Glaeser, Edward L. & Ponzetto, Giacomo A.M., 2018. "The political economy of transportation investment," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 4-26.
  5. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C.F., 2007. "The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 309-319, November.
  6. A. Patrick Behrer & Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Andrei Shleifer, 2021. "Securing Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(4), pages 1157-1192.
  7. Paul F. Byrne, 2017. "Have Post-Kelo Restrictions on Eminent Domain Influenced State Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 31(1), pages 81-91, February.
  8. Nan Guo & Edwin Hon Wan Chan & Esther Hiu Kwan Yung, 2020. "Alternative Governance Model for Historical Building Conservation in China: From Property Rights Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-16, December.
  9. Caggese, Andrea & Cuñat, Vicente & Metzger, Daniel, 2019. "Firing the wrong workers: Financing constraints and labor misallocation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(3), pages 589-607.
  10. Ram Singh, 2012. "Inefficiency And Abuse Of Compulsory Land Acquisition--An Enquiry Into The Way Forward," Working papers 209, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  11. Romain MELOT, 2012. "Conflicts over compensation of expropriation. The case of farmland in France," ERSA conference papers ersa12p458, European Regional Science Association.
  12. Yun‐chien Chang, 2009. "Empire Building and Fiscal Illusion? An Empirical Study of Government Official Behaviors in Takings," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(3), pages 541-584, September.
  13. Portillo, Javier E., 2019. "Land-assembly and externalities: How do positive post-development externalities affect land aggregation outcomes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 104-124.
  14. Chen, Daniel L. & Yeh, Susan, 2016. "Government Expropriation Increases Economic Growth and Racial Inequality: Evidence from Eminent Domain," IAST Working Papers 16-46, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  15. Iljoong Kim & Sungkyu Park, 2010. "Eminent domain power and afterwards: Leviathan’s post-taking opportunism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 209-227, April.
  16. Alessandro Marchesiani & Ed Nosal, 2017. "Private takings," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 639-657, June.
  17. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
    • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  18. Shupp Robert & Cadigan John & Schmitt Pamela M. & Swope Kurtis J., 2013. "Institutions and information in multilateral bargaining experiments," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 485-524, June.
  19. Steven Shavell, 2010. "Eminent Domain versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperfect Information about Owners' Valuations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-27, February.
  20. Richard Hornbeck & Daniel Keniston, 2017. "Creative Destruction: Barriers to Urban Growth and the Great Boston Fire of 1872," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1365-1398, June.
  21. Steven Shavell, 2007. "Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperpect Information About Owners' Valuation," NBER Working Papers 13564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. repec:tsa:wpaper:0154mkt is not listed on IDEAS
  23. repec:jpe:journl:1287 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Alfredo Esposto, 1998. "Takings, litigation, and just compensation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(4), pages 397-412, December.
  25. Henry J. Munneke & C. F. Sirmans & Barrett Slade, 2025. "Land Prices and the Development Process," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 70-94, July.
  26. Kevin Guerin, 2002. "Protection against Government Takings: Compensation for Regulation?," Treasury Working Paper Series 02/18, New Zealand Treasury.
  27. Yun‐chien Chang, 2011. "An Empirical Study of Court‐Adjudicated Takings Compensation in New York City: 1990–2003," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 384-412, June.
  28. Daniel Göller & Michael Hewer, 2014. "Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: The Bilateral Investment Case," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(3), pages 520-536, September.
  29. Yu, Peiyong, 2015. "The Effect of Eminent Domain on Private and Mixed Development on Property Values," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 45(2).
  30. Casey B. Mulligan, 2015. "In-Kind Taxes, Behavior, and Comparative Advantage," NBER Working Papers 21586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Colwell, Peter F. & Munneke, Henry J., 1997. "The Structure of Urban Land Prices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
  32. Kanazawa, Mark, 2023. "Politics and eminent domain: Evidence from the 1879 California constitution," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
  33. Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew, 2010. "Repeated adjustment of delegated powers and the history of eminent domain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 99-112, June.
  34. Carl Kitchens, 2014. "The use of eminent domain in land assembly: The case of the Tennessee Valley Authority," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 455-466, September.
  35. Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E., 2016. "Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 16-30.
  36. Winn, Abel M. & McCarter, Matthew W., 2018. "Who's holding out? An experimental study of the benefits and burdens of eminent domain," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 176-185.
  37. Wen, Lan-jiao & Butsic, Van & Stapp, Jared R. & Zhang, An-lu, 2020. "What happens to land price when a rural construction land market legally opens in China? A spatiotemporal analysis of Nanhai district from 2010 to 2015," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  38. Alan W. Evans, 1983. "The Determination of the Price of Land," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 20(2), pages 119-129, May.
  39. Steven P. Lanza & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Moussa Diop, 2013. "The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of Kelo," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 27(4), pages 352-362, November.
  40. Dick M. Carpenter II & John K. Ross, 2010. "Do Restrictions on Eminent Domain Harm Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(4), pages 337-351, November.
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