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Politics and eminent domain: Evidence from the 1879 California Constitution

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  • Mark T. Kanazawa

    (Carleton College)

Abstract

This paper explores the politics of eminent domain, using a specific historical episode: the enactment of the new California constitution in 1879. It presents evidence that the failure of a constitutional provision that would have codified eminent domain powers for water development resulted from a complex interchange of economic interests among farmers, miners, and urban residents. This evidence was manifested in delegate behavior on the floor of the constitutional convention in 1878, including various roll-call votes, which are subjected to an econometric analysis. The results have implications for the interpretation of legislative eminent domain decisions, and the degree to which economic development processes are shaped by the institutional environment in which they occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark T. Kanazawa, 2023. "Politics and eminent domain: Evidence from the 1879 California Constitution," Working Papers 2023-01, Carleton College, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:avv:wpaper:2023-01
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.carleton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=econ_repec
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • N5 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture

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