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Assessing Kelo’s Legacy: Do Increased Taxes and New Jobs Justify Use of Eminent Domain?

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

  • Kathleen Segerson

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. New London (2005) justified the use of eminent domain for redevelopment takings based on the anticipated spillover benefits to the community in the form of increased taxes and new jobs. This paper asks whether this is a coherent economic rationale for allowing expropriation of residential land for private development. We show that, in the absence of a market distortion, the answer is generally no. However, when there is a pre-existing imperfection in the land and/or labor market, it is possible, though not guaranteed, that allowing eminent domain will increase social welfare. The reason, however, is not because of the increased tax revenue or employment per se, but rather because eminent domain increases industrial/commercial land use above the inefficiently low level that arises in the presence of the distortions. Thus, setting aside questions about fairness or holdouts, we show that whether using eminent domain for private takings can be justified on the basis of economic efficiency hinges on the existence of market distortions and the relative values of residential vs. industrial/commercial land in that particular market.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2021. "Assessing Kelo’s Legacy: Do Increased Taxes and New Jobs Justify Use of Eminent Domain?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 161-176, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:63:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11146-020-09772-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-020-09772-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven P. Lanza & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Moussa Diop, 2013. "The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of Kelo," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 27(4), pages 352-362, November.
    2. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 160-174.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem Under Sequential Bargaining," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 372-390.
    4. Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen & Sirmans, C.F., 2008. "Tax Motivated Takings," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 61(4), pages 579-591, December.
    5. Turnbull Geoffrey K & Salvino Robert F., 2009. "Do Broader Eminent Domain Powers Increase Government Size?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 785-806, December.
    6. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Sequential Bargaining, Land Assembly, and the Holdout Problem," Working papers 2011-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2012.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eminent domain; Public use; Spillover benefit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

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