Tax Motivated Takings
Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners' true values. We therefore propose a reassessment scheme that greatly reduces the risk of this sort of inefficiency.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2007.
"A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings,"
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 160-174.
- Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings," Working papers 2006-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2007.
- Steven Shavell, 2007. "Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchase of Land Given Imperpect Information About Owners' Valuation," NBER Working Papers 13564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)