The Cost of Kelo: Are Property Taxes a Form of Public Use?
This paper examines the economic implications of the definition of public use advanced by the Supreme Court in the case of Kelo v. New London. In its ruling, the Court asserted that the Fifth Amendment public use requirement is satisfied if the taking in question, even if for private ends, promises enhanced jobs and tax revenues for the community. The paper first reviews the law and economics of public use, and then argues that the Court’s justification creates the potential for an alliance between local governments and developers that will increase the risk of overuse of eminent domain. Underlying this risk is the unobservability of landowners’ subjective values, which requires local governments to rely on market value as the basis for property taxation.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2014|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063|
Phone: (860) 486-4889
Fax: (860) 486-4463
Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nosal, Ed, 2001. "The taking of land: market value compensation should be paid," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 431-443, December.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
- Flavio Menezes & Rohan Pitchford, 2004. "A model of seller holdout," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 231-253, August.
- Thomas Miceli, 2011.
"Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities,"
Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities," Working papers 2009-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem Under Sequential Bargaining," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 372-390.
- Hovenkamp, Herbert, 1991. "Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 225-247, June.
- Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2008. "Accurate Valuation in the Absence of Markets," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 334-358, May.
- Strange William C., 1995. "Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 317-332, November.
- Cohen, Lloyd, 1991. "Holdouts and Free Riders," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 351-362, June.
- Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen & Sirmans, C.F., 2008. "Tax Motivated Takings," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 61(4), pages 579-591, December.
- Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December.
- Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark McConnel)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.