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Property Law

Listed author(s):
  • Lueck, Dean
  • Miceli, Thomas J.

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. It shows how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter examines both the rationale for legal doctrine, and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It also examines various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property, and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced? In answering these questions we argue that property rights and property law can be best understood as a system of societal rules designed to maximize social wealth. They do this by creating incentives for people to maintain and invest in assets, which leads to specialization and trade.

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This chapter was published in:
  • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
  • This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Law and Economics with number 1-03.
    Handle: RePEc:eee:lawchp:1-03
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevierdirect.com/product.jsp?isbn=9780444512352

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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