IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulatory Takings


  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

  • Kathleen Segerson

    (University of Connecticut)


A regulatory taking occurs when a government regulation reduces the value of private property to such a degree that the owner is entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. This chapter reviews legal and economic theories aimed at determining when a regulation crosses the compensation threshold. It also assesses the consequences of various compensation rules on the efficiency of land use decisions and government policymaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-16

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robert Innes & Stephen Polasky & John Tschirhart, 1998. "Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 35-52, Summer.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    3. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
      • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Nosal, Ed, 2001. "The taking of land: market value compensation should be paid," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 431-443, December.
    5. Miceli, Thomas J., 2008. "Public goods, taxes, and takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 287-293, December.
    6. Cannaday Roger E., 1994. "Condominium Covenants: Cats, Yes; Dogs, No," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 71-82, January.
    7. Hughes, William T, Jr & Turnbull, Geoffrey K, 1996. "Restrictive Land Covenants," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 9-21, January.
    8. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
    9. T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2005. "Fair and Efficient Compensation for Taking Property under Uncertainty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 471-495, August.
    10. Schall, Lawrence D, 1976. "Urban Renewal Policy and Economic Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 612-628, September.
    11. Innes, Robert, 1997. "Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 403-432, October.
    12. Polasky, Stephen & Doremus, Holly, 1998. "When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 22-47, January.
    13. Donald Wittman, 1984. "Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 57-80, January.
    14. Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2002. "Land Development under the Threat of Taking," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 290-308, October.
    15. Lueck, Dean & Michael, Jeffrey A, 2003. "Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 27-60, April.
    16. Robert Innes, 2000. "The Economics of Takings and Compensation When Land and Its Public Use Value Are in Private Hands," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 76(2), pages 195-212.
    17. Niemann, Paul & Shapiro, Perry, 2008. "Efficiency and fairness: Compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 157-165, September.
    18. Riddiough, Timothy J., 1997. "The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Taking Risk on Land Value and Development Activity," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 56-77, January.
    19. Jon H. Goldstein & William D. Watson, 1997. "Property Rights, Regulatory Taking, And Compensation: Implications For Environmental Protection," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(4), pages 32-42, October.
    20. Kaplow, Louis, 1992. " Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(4), pages 525-541.
    21. Ronald Giammarino & Ed Nosal, 2004. "Loggers vs. campers: compensation for the taking of property rights," Working Paper 0406, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    22. Truesdell, Marie K. & Bergstrom, John C. & Dorfman, Jeffrey H., 2006. "Regulatory Takings and the Diminution of Value: An Empirical Analysis of Takings and Givings," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(03), pages 585-595, December.
    23. Ron Giammarino, 2005. "Loggers versus Campers: Compensation for the Taking of Property Rights," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 136-152, April.
    24. Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December.
    25. Fischel, William A & Shapiro, Perry, 1988. "Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 269-293, June.
    26. Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus & Bruce Rettig, 1997. "Endangered Species Conservation On Private Land," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(4), pages 66-76, October.
    27. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
    28. Ghosh, Shubha, 1997. "Takings, the exit option and just compensation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-176, June.
    29. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Lange, Andreas & Liu, Xiangping, 2014. "Land Development Restrictions and Preemptive Action - On the Benefits of Differentiated Regulation," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 393-414, December.
    2. Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2010. "Irreversible development and eminent domain: Compensation rules, land use and efficiency," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 243-254, December.
    3. Horn, Henrik & Tangerås, Thomas, 2016. "Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements," Working Paper Series 1140, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. Robert M. Hunt & Tim VandenBerg, 1998. "Discouraging Federal actions that reduce the value of private property: evaluating procedural and financial approaches," Working Papers 98-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Thomas J. Miceli, 2011. "The Use of Economics for Understanding Law: An Economist's View of the Cathedral," Working papers 2011-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    6. Louis Kaplow, 2003. "Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework," NBER Working Papers 9596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item


    Compensation; eminent domain; regulation; takings;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark McConnel). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.