Police Powers, Regulatory Takings and the Efficient Compensation of Domestic and Foreign Investors
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- Aisbett, Emma & Karp, Larry & McAusland, Carol, 2008. "Police-powers, regulatory takings and the efficient compensation of domestic and foreign investors," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt5x84h5kf, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Nosal, Ed, 2001. "The taking of land: market value compensation should be paid," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 431-443, December.
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- Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
- Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, 2006. "Political Economy And The Efficiency Of Compensation For Takings," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 188-202, January.
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- Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Horn, Henrik & Tangerås, Thomas, 2016.
"Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements,"
Working Paper Series
1140, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Henrik Horn & Thomas Tangerås, 2017. "Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements," RSCAS Working Papers 2017/19, European University Institute.
- Horn, Henrik & Tangerï¿½s, Thomas, 2017. "Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 11879, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kohler, Wilhelm Kaspar & Stähler, Frank, 2016.
"The Economics of Investor Protection: ISDS versus National Treatment,"
Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change
145652, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Wilhelm Kohler & Frank Stähler, 2016. "The Economics of Investor Protection: ISDS versus National Treatment," CESifo Working Paper Series 5766, CESifo Group Munich.
- Schjelderup, Guttorm & Stähler, Frank, 2017. "Investor State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behavior," Discussion Papers 2017/4, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:98:y:2017:i:c:p:341-353 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:weltar:v:153:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10290-017-0287-z is not listed on IDEAS
- Aisbett, Emma & Busse, Matthias & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2016. "Bilateral investment treaties do work: Until they don't," Kiel Working Papers 2021, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Aisbett Emma & Karp Larry & McAusland Carol, 2010.
"Compensation for Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Agreements: Implications of National Treatment and Rights to Invest,"
Journal of Globalization and Development,
De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-35, December.
- Emma Aisbett & Larry Karp & Carol McAusland, 2010. "Compensation for Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Agreements: Implications of National Treatment and Rights to Invest," CEPR Discussion Papers 648, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Emma Aisbett, 2010. "Powerful Multinational or Persecuted Foreigners: ‘Foreignness’ and Influence over Government," CEPR Discussion Papers 638, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2017.
"Large investors, regulatory taking and investor-state dispute settlement,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 341-353.
- Kai A. Konrad, 2016. "Large Investors, Regulatory Taking and Investor-State Dispute Settlement," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2016-10_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Rod Falvey & Neil Foster-McGregor, 2017.
"Heterogeneous effects of bilateral investment treaties,"
Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv),
Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), pages 631-656.
- Falvey, Rod & Foster-McGregor, Neil, 2017. "Heterogeneous effects of bilateral investment treaties," MERIT Working Papers 027, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, 2016. "Is the Government Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent-Domain Exercises," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 437-469.
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