Protection against Government Takings: Compensation for Regulation?
The paper responds to recent debate in New Zealand on the power of the government to take private property, directly or through regulatory constraints. This aspect of regulation has received less attention in New Zealand than it warrants. This paper addresses the issue of which protections against takings are appropriate, and the role of compensation as a protective device. A taking can be broadly defined an act by which a government assumes or assigns control over all or part of a property right held by a private party. Government regulation is typically not treated as a taking. In practice, compensation is normally required only for physical takings, such as the acquisition of land, and is not available for takings through regulation, such as restricting the right to use land in a particular way. New Zealand has three options for improved protection against takings: a tighter regime for scrutinising the quality of regulation, more restricted takings powers, and extended compensation provisions. The desirability and practicality of a greater role for compensation requires, however, more detailed consideration. The paper aims to stimulate further debate in this area as an aspect of the wider debate on regulatory quality.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2002|
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- Kevin Guerin, 2001. "Regulatory Harmonisation - Issues for New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 01/01, New Zealand Treasury.
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- Kevin Guerin, 2002. "Subsidiarity: Implications for New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 02/03, New Zealand Treasury.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
- Blume, Lawrence & Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Shapiro, Perry, 1984. "The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 71-92, February.
- Fischel, William A. & Shapiro, Perry, 1989. "A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 115-128, December.
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