Land Development Restrictions and Preemptive Action- On the benefits of differentiated regulation
We address the problem of preemptive land development to avoid future regulation. We demonstrate that differentiated treatment of landowners is generally essential to optimally deal with preemption. While differentiated policies improve welfare, they require the regulator to be informed about landowners' types. We use a mechanism design approach to deal with the case of asymmetric information. We show how a differentiated treatment of landowners is still feasible and beneficial. Our mechanism allows some landowners to face less stringent future regulation levels against a payment that is made ex ante or is anticipated ex ante. More generally, agents (landowners) may voluntarily commit to more stringent regulation if this gives them more leniency earlier or later. Our paper thereby shows the advantages of allowing such trade-offs by linking regulation across multiple periods.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
| Length: | |
| Date of creation: | 2013 |
| Handle: | RePEc:ags:aaea13:151283 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 Phone: (414) 918-3190 Fax: (414) 276-3349 Web page: http://www.aaea.org Email: More information through EDIRC
|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert Innes & Stephen Polasky & John Tschirhart, 1998. "Takings, Compensation and Endangered Species Protection on Private Lands," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 35-52, Summer.
- Innes, Robert, 1997. "Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 403-432, October.
- Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
- Lueck, Dean & Michael, Jeffrey A, 2003. "Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 27-60, April.
- Smith, Rodney B. W. & Shogren, Jason F., 2002. "Voluntary Incentive Design for Endangered Species Protection," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 169-187, March.
- John A. List & Michael Margolis & Daniel E. Osgood, 2006. "Is the Endangered Species Act Endangering Species?," NBER Working Papers 12777, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Langpap, Christian & Wu, JunJie, 2004. "Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 435-457, May.
- Daniel Rondeau & Erwin Bulte, 2007. "Wildlife Damage and Agriculture: A Dynamic Analysis of Compensation Schemes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(2), pages 490-507.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Langpap, Christian, 2006. "Conservation of endangered species: Can incentives work for private landowners?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 558-572, June.
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea13:151283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.