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On the Rationale of Coercive Land Acquisitions

Author

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  • Kaur Karamjit

    () (Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India)

Abstract

This study seeks to frame the rationale of land acquisition by explicating on the market conditions necessitating the suspension of consensual exchanges in favor of the use of coercion to meet the land supply requirements of a project, and then examines the reasoning governing the use of the acquisition legislation in India. It has been argued that the law of land acquisition, by terminating the right of the seller to negotiate the conditions of the exchange and by forcibly re-allocating the land to the other party, can help in easing out land transactions only in conditions where the inordinate bargaining power of the seller, possessing the non-substitutable unit of land, is the source of the obstacles at the stage of bargaining. In Indian context, however, it is observed that the application of the land acquisition act does not fit into the economic rationale of the acquisition law as a law to correct for the specific type of land supply constraints associated with non-substitutability; rather, the concern of availing the low cost supply of land appeared to be the dominant motivation guiding the use of acquisitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaur Karamjit, 2017. "On the Rationale of Coercive Land Acquisitions," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-16, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:8:y:2017:i:2:p:16:n:5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cadigan, John & Schmitt, Pamela & Shupp, Robert & Swope, Kurtis, 2011. "The holdout problem and urban sprawl: Experimental evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-81, January.
    2. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem Under Sequential Bargaining," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 372-390.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Sequential Bargaining, Land Assembly, and the Holdout Problem," Working papers 2011-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2012.
    4. Miceli, Thomas J. & Sirmans, C.F., 2007. "The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 309-319, November.
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