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Do Broader Eminent Domain Powers Increase Government Size?

Author

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  • Turnbull Geoffrey K

    (Georgia State University Coastal Carolina University)

  • Salvino Robert F.

    (Georgia State University Coastal Carolina University)

Abstract

The 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision Kelo v New London allows using eminent domain to transfer property from one private party to another when it serves a broadly defined public purpose such as economic development. This paper examines the effect of this doctrine on the size of state and local governments. In the leviathan model, constitutional constraints are needed to control government expansion. The Kelo decision removes one such constitutional constraint on how state and local governments gain command over privately owned resources. The empirical results show that the breadth of eminent domain power affects the size of the public sector; states that explicitly empower their local governments to use eminent domain for private economic development have larger state and local public sectors than those that do not.

Suggested Citation

  • Turnbull Geoffrey K & Salvino Robert F., 2009. "Do Broader Eminent Domain Powers Increase Government Size?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 785-806, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:32
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1395
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2010. "Irreversible development and eminent domain: Compensation rules, land use and efficiency," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 243-254, December.
    2. Steven P. Lanza & Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans & Moussa Diop, 2013. "The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development in the Era of Kelo," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 27(4), pages 352-362, November.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2021. "Assessing Kelo’s Legacy: Do Increased Taxes and New Jobs Justify Use of Eminent Domain?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 161-176, August.
    4. Ronit Levine‐Schnur, 2023. "Is the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre‐ and post‐Kelo," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 449-468, April.
    5. Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Robert F. Salvino & Michael T. Tasto, 2014. "Does the power to use eminent domain for economic development actually enhance economic development?," Chapters, in: Robert F. Salvino Jr. & Michael T. Tasto & Gregory M. Randolph (ed.), Entrepreneurial Action, Public Policy, and Economic Outcomes, chapter 7, pages 119-133, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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