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The effects of decentralization on special interest groups

Author

Listed:
  • Robert F. Salvino

    () (Coastal Carolina University)

  • Gregory M. Randolph

    (Southern New Hampshire University)

  • Geoffrey K. Turnbull

    (University of Central Florida)

  • Michael T. Tasto

    (Southern New Hampshire University)

Abstract

It is well established in the literature that the number of interest group organizations varies across countries and states, with economic freedom and other institutional factors playing important roles in economic growth and prosperity. At the same time, the literature offers little empirical evidence of the influence of institutions on interest group behavior. This study presents new evidence on the extent to which institutional structure, in particular state and local governmental fiscal decentralization, promotes or hinders interest group formation. Expenditure decentralization, more so than revenue decentralization, appears to constrain the number of industry-type groups while having little effect on social-type groups in US states. The results provide further evidence of the importance of institutional quality and structure across states and suggest important directions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert F. Salvino & Gregory M. Randolph & Geoffrey K. Turnbull & Michael T. Tasto, 2019. "The effects of decentralization on special interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 191-213, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:181:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00651-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00651-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal decentralization; Institutions; Interest groups; Rent seeking; Government fragmentation;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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