Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/kap/copoec.html
Content
March 2019, Volume 30, Issue 1
- 1-30 Electoral systems and the economy: a firm-level analysis
by Isa Camyar & Bahar Ulupinar - 31-49 Using tax dollars for re-election: the impact of pork-barrel spending on electoral success
by J. Zachary Klingensmith - 50-69 Political polarization, term length and too much delegation
by Carsten Hefeker - 70-95 Escape from Europe: a calculus of consent model of the origins of liberal institutions in the North American colonies
by Vlad Tarko & Kyle O’Donnell - 96-113 Liberalism and great upheaval: What did classical liberals do in the Tsarist Russia?
by Leonid Krasnozhon & Mykola Bunyk - 114-129 Metaphysical justification for an economic constitution? Franz Böhm and the concept of natural law
by Daniel Nientiedt
December 2018, Volume 29, Issue 4
- 371-388 Path dependence and transitions from tyranny to democracy: evidence from ancient Greece
by Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen - 389-412 Making direct democracy work: a rational-actor perspective on the graphe paranomon in ancient Athens
by Carl Hampus Lyttkens & George Tridimas & Anna Lindgren - 413-423 Arbitration in classical Athens
by Bryan C. McCannon - 424-439 The law and economics of sycophancy
by Daniel J. D’Amico - 440-464 What was the law of Leptines’ really about? Reflections on Athenian public economy and legislation in the fourth century BCE
by Mirko Canevaro
September 2018, Volume 29, Issue 3
- 253-267 Political parties: insights from a tri-planar model of political economy
by David J. Hebert & Richard E. Wagner - 268-280 The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access
by Louis Corriveau - 281-302 The effect of equalizing differences on tax-price: explaining patterns of political support across industries
by Joseph Michael Newhard - 303-316 Interest group support for non-group issues
by Randall G. Holcombe & Robert J. Gmeiner - 317-337 Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?
by Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega - 338-338 Correction to: Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?
by Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega - 339-369 The political economy of Kulturkampf: evidence from imperial Prussia and republican Turkey
by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis & Theocharis N. Grigoriadis
June 2018, Volume 29, Issue 2
- 115-136 Social contracts for real moral agents: a synthesis of public reason and public choice approaches to constitutional design
by Kevin Vallier - 137-170 A short history of constitutional liberalism in America
by Roger D. Congleton - 171-192 Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government
by Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young - 193-229 Judicial impartiality in politically charged cases
by Raphaël Franck - 230-251 Why the Arab Spring turned Islamic: the political economy of Islam
by Mario Ferrero
March 2018, Volume 29, Issue 1
- 1-19 Regime types, ideological leanings, and the natural resource curse
by Chong-Sup Kim & Seungho Lee - 20-39 Institutions and the effectiveness of expenditures on environmental protection: evidence from Middle Eastern countries
by Hassan F. Gholipour & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan - 40-68 Do democracies have higher current account deficits?
by Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou - 69-92 The weight of the median voter ageing on public debt
by Ernest Dautovic - 93-113 Contributions to the exchequer funds by state level public sector enterprises: does political alignment matter?
by Ritika Jain
December 2017, Volume 28, Issue 4
- 311-320 A proposal for a more objective measure of de facto constitutional constraints
by Moshe Yanovskiy & Tim Ginker - 321-345 De jure and de facto determinants of power: evidence from Mississippi
by Graziella Bertocchi & Arcangelo Dimico - 346-372 Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption
by Jamie Bologna Pavlik - 373-406 Managing judges mathematically: an empirical study of the medical malpractice litigations in Shanghai
by Wei Zhang - 407-421 Who pays taxes? Liturgies and the Antidosis procedure in Ancient Athens
by Bryan C. McCannon
September 2017, Volume 28, Issue 3
- 209-230 Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making
by George Tridimas - 231-256 The institutional rationale of central banking reconsidered
by Pablo Paniagua - 257-269 The debt brake of the German states: a faulty design?
by Gebhard Kirchgässner - 270-285 Buchanan on increasing returns and anticommons
by Yong J. Yoon - 286-310 Normative economics and paternalism: the problem with the preference-satisfaction account of welfare
by Cyril Hédoin
June 2017, Volume 28, Issue 2
- 97-116 Federalism and horizontal equity across Switzerland and Germany: a new rationale for a decentralized fiscal structure
by Peter Schwarz - 117-141 Fixed versus flexible election terms: explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s election cycle
by J. Stephen Ferris & Derek E. H. Olmstead - 142-166 Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies
by Florian Kiesow Cortez & Jerg Gutmann - 167-192 Poor institutions as a comparative advantage
by Cortney Stephen Rodet - 193-194 Erratum to: Poor institutions as a comparative advantage
by Cortney Stephen Rodet - 195-208 The problem of constitutional legitimation: what the debate on electoral quotas tells us about the legitimacy of decision-making rules in constitutional choice
by Aris Trantidis
March 2017, Volume 28, Issue 1
- 1-17 Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry
by Jac C. Heckelman - 18-34 Gordon Tullock’s ill-fated appendix: “Flatland Revisited”
by David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart - 35-47 Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?
by Stefan Voigt - 48-61 Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics
by Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi & Alice Guerra - 62-78 Political incentives for rent creation
by Randall G. Holcombe - 79-96 Expressive voting and two-dimensional political competition: an application to law and order policy by New Labour in the UK
by Stephen Drinkwater & Colin Jennings
December 2016, Volume 27, Issue 4
- 355-376 Economic globalization and the change of electoral rules
by Christian Walter Martin & Nils D. Steiner - 377-398 Native American reservation constitutions
by R. Warren Anderson - 399-417 Fairness and efficiency in US Revolutionary War takings and post-war debt redemption
by Jonathan Stone & Jeffrey Wagner - 418-434 No progressive taxation without discrimination? On the generality of the law in the classical liberal tradition
by Åsbjørn Melkevik - 435-450 Will a government find it financially easier to neutralize a looming protest if more groups are involved?
by Oded Stark & Ewa Zawojska
September 2016, Volume 27, Issue 3
- 249-259 We start from here
by Russell Hardin - 260-272 Is democracy compatible with global institutions?
by Josep M. Colomer - 273-298 EU enlargement and satisfaction with democracy: a peculiar case of immiserizing growth
by Barbara Dluhosch & Daniel Horgos & Klaus W. Zimmermann - 299-318 Old (Chicago) school, new century: the link between Knight and Simons’ Chicago plan to Buchanan’s constitutional money
by Scott Burns - 319-331 Interbranch cooperation and the shadow of the future
by Travis J. Baker & Thomas Schwartz - 332-353 An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules
by Keith L. Dougherty & Robi Ragan
June 2016, Volume 27, Issue 2
- 112-123 Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly
by Dennis C. Mueller - 124-141 Where are the rent seekers?
by Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung - 142-157 Rent seeking and the economics of corruption
by Toke S. Aidt - 158-178 Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship
by Thomas Apolte - 179-193 Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government
by Roger D. Congleton - 194-213 Gordon Tullock as a political scientist
by Michael Munger & Georg Vanberg - 214-226 Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice
by Arthur Schram - 227-247 On the extraordinary scholarly life and times of Gordon Tullock
by William F. Shughart & Robert D. Tollison
March 2016, Volume 27, Issue 1
- 1-40 State provision of constitutional goods
by Romain Espinosa - 1-40 State provision of constitutional goods
by Romain Espinosa - 41-65 On the overthrow or endurance of kings
by George Tridimas - 41-65 On the overthrow or endurance of kings
by George Tridimas - 66-92 An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014
by Jarosław Kantorowicz & Nuno Garoupa - 66-92 An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014
by Jarosław Kantorowicz & Nuno Garoupa - 93-110 Hayek on corporate social responsibility
by Shigeki Kusunoki - 93-110 Hayek on corporate social responsibility
by Shigeki Kusunoki
December 2015, Volume 26, Issue 4
- 391-420 Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence
by Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume - 421-433 Is foreign aid a pure public good for donor country citizens?
by Travis Wiseman & Andrew Young - 434-441 Endogenous voting weights for elected representatives and redistricting
by Justin Svec & James Hamilton - 442-454 Analytic conservatism and analytic radicalism: Of understated distinctions and other analytical things
by Michael Brooks - 455-474 Modeling the individual for constitutional choice
by Brian Kogelmann - 475-494 “The other side of the argument”: Isaiah Berlin versus F. A. von Hayek on liberty, public policies, and the market
by Athanassios Pitsoulis & Steffen Groß
September 2015, Volume 26, Issue 3
- 247-280 Constitutional property rights protection and economic growth: evidence from the post-communist transition
by Christian Bjørnskov - 281-306 The importance of the political process on corporate tax policy
by Åsa Hansson & Susan Porter & Susan Williams - 307-327 The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong
by Eric Ip - 328-355 Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India
by Shruti Rajagopalan - 356-374 Votes on behalf of children: a legitimate way of giving them a voice in politics?
by Stephan Wolf & Nils Goldschmidt & Thomas Petersen - 375-390 Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm
by Alexander Salter
June 2015, Volume 26, Issue 2
- 121-136 Income and the stability of democracy: Pushing beyond the borders of logic to explain a strong correlation?
by Federico Traversa - 137-158 The public choice of university organization: a stylized story of a constitutional reform
by Martin Paldam - 159-170 Strategic and expressive voting
by Brad Taylor - 171-189 Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats
by Marco Sorge - 190-220 Direct voting and proxy voting
by James Green-Armytage - 221-245 Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared
by Barbara Krug & Alexander Libman
March 2015, Volume 26, Issue 1
- 1-3 Introduction: a new perspective on modern German history
by Steven Webb & Joachim Zweynert - 4-18 The concept of Ordnungspolitik through the lens of the theory of limited and open access orders
by Joachim Zweynert - 19-37 Becoming an open democratic capitalist society: a two-century historical perspective on Germany’s evolving political economy
by Steven Webb - 38-60 Weimar Germany: The first open access order that failed?
by Alfred Reckendrees - 61-86 Capitalist transformation without political participation: German capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth century
by Gerhard Wegner - 87-102 On the stability of open access orders: the Federal Republic of Germany since the 1960s
by Jan-Otmar Hesse - 103-120 The mature limited access order at the doorstep: Imperial Germany and contemporary China in transition
by Erik Grimmer-Solem
December 2014, Volume 25, Issue 4
- 331-353 Public choice and the development of modern laboratory experimental methods in economics and political science
by Charles Plott - 354-375 Fiscal federalism, jurisdictional competition, and the size of government
by Jason Sorens - 376-392 Crisis and belief: confirmation bias and the behavioral political economy of recession
by Petrik Runst - 393-406 Land, men and taxation: an application to pre-modern China and Europe Erik Jones’ European Miracle revisited
by Charles Blankart - 407-433 Loss of control: legislature changes and the state–local relationship
by Jessica Hennessey
September 2014, Volume 25, Issue 3
- 231-252 James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order
by Lars Feld - 253-264 James Buchanan’s public debt theory: a rational reconstruction
by Richard Wagner - 265-279 Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan
by James Gwartney & Randall Holcombe - 280-300 Is there a self-enforcing monetary constitution?
by Alexander Salter - 301-329 The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?
by Martin Ardanaz & Carlos Scartascini
June 2014, Volume 25, Issue 2
- 125-136 On a fallacy in the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency–equity analysis
by David Ellerman - 137-153 Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic
by Josef Brechler & Adam Geršl - 154-176 Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments
by Karsten Mause - 177-206 Demand for litigation in the absence of traditions of rule of law: an example of Ottoman and Habsburg legacies in Romania
by Martin Mendelski & Alexander Libman - 207-229 Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration
by David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann
March 2014, Volume 25, Issue 1
- 2-17 The role of homo oeconomicus in the political economy of James Buchanan
by Gebhard Kirchgässner - 18-38 James M. Buchanan’s contractarianism and modern liberalism
by Viktor Vanberg - 39-67 The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan
by Roger Congleton - 68-87 Reasoning about rules
by Alan Hamlin - 88-102 Constraining Leviathan
by Dennis Mueller - 103-109 The reason for ‘The Reason of Rules’
by Geoffrey Brennan - 110-124 What should classical liberal political economists do?
by Peter Boettke
December 2013, Volume 24, Issue 4
- 265-284 Buchanan clubs
by Todd Sandler - 285-294 European unification: a new proposal
by Bruno Frey - 295-309 Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law
by Shruti Rajagopalan & Richard Wagner - 310-335 US shadow economies: a state-level study
by Travis Wiseman - 336-351 When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?
by Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca
September 2013, Volume 24, Issue 3
- 177-198 On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers
by Roger Congleton - 199-214 Independent central banks as a component of the separation of powers
by Peter Bernholz - 215-238 Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls
by Niklas Potrafke - 239-264 The constitutional political economy of virtual worlds
by Carl Mildenberger
June 2013, Volume 24, Issue 2
- 87-107 Decentralization and growth: what if the cross-jurisdiction approach had met a dead end?
by Pierre Salmon - 108-124 Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance
by Roger Congleton & Yongjing Zhang - 125-138 Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game
by Robert Oxoby - 139-165 Distributive consideration in institutional change: the case of Zia’s Islamization policy in Pakistan
by Karim Khan - 166-172 Analytic radicalism
by Brad Taylor - 173-176 Conservatism and radicalism
by Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin
March 2013, Volume 24, Issue 1
- 1-1 On the editorial transition
by Roger Congleton & Stefan Voigt - 2-18 A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders
by Anthony Evans & Nikolai Wenzel - 19-42 On the problem of scale: Hayek, Kohr, Jacobs and the reinvention of the political state
by Benjamen Gussen - 43-56 Veto players and foreign aid provision
by Yu Wang & Shuai Jin - 57-85 Islamic constitutionalism and rule of law: a constitutional economics perspective
by Moamen Gouda
December 2012, Volume 23, Issue 4
- 279-301 New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity
by Karsten Mause & Friedrich Groeteke - 302-336 Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization
by Alexander Libman - 337-356 The political economy of civil society
by Adrian Pabst & Roberto Scazzieri - 357-379 State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture
by Paul Aligica & Vlad Tarko
September 2012, Volume 23, Issue 3
- 181-181 Introductory note and acknowledgements
by Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard Wagner - 182-198 The political economy of public debt
by Geoffrey Brennan - 199-212 Indebted state versus intermediary state: who owes what to whom?
by Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard Wagner - 213-243 Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009
by J. Ferris & Stanley Winer & Bernard Grofman - 244-260 A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts
by Reiner Eichenberger & David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann - 261-277 Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons
by Richard Wagner
June 2012, Volume 23, Issue 2
- 95-133 Economic freedom and growth. Which policies matter the most?
by Martin Rode & Sebastian Coll - 134-165 Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states
by George Crowley - 166-180 Ethnic segregation and the quality of government: the importance of regional diversity
by Andreas Kyriacou
March 2012, Volume 23, Issue 1
- 1-21 Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot
by George Tridimas - 22-44 Agenda control in an unstable multiparty parliamentary democracy: evidence from the Israeli public sector
by Maoz Rosenthal - 45-65 Designing the institutions of international liberalism: some contributions from the interwar period
by Fabio Masini - 66-93 Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America
by John Dove
December 2011, Volume 22, Issue 4
- 303-324 Minimizing the losers: regime satisfaction in multi-level systems
by Katharina Holzinger & Andrea Schneider & Klaus Zimmermann - 325-354 The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration
by Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler - 355-372 Decentralization, agency costs, and the new economic constitution of China
by Eric Ip & Michael Law - 373-397 Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment
by Timo Tammi
September 2011, Volume 22, Issue 3
- 203-220 Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process
by Jeremy Horpedahl - 221-237 The political economy of constitutional restraints
by Dimitrios Xefteris - 238-264 Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators
by Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt - 265-286 The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures
by Gregory Randolph - 287-301 Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation?
by Louis Jaeck
June 2011, Volume 22, Issue 2
- 103-121 Informal accountability, credible actions, and democratization in Taiwan
by O. Yap - 122-140 Shock therapy and the transfer of institutions: the new debate and some lessons from the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in southwestern Germany
by Joachim Zweynert - 141-172 Making executive politics mutually productive and fair
by T. Durant - 173-190 Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League
by Alexander Fink - 191-197 Federalism and exit costs
by Gebhard Kirchgässner & Mark Schelker - 198-199 Federalism and individual liberty: a rejoinder
by C. Mantzavinos - 200-202 Vernon Smith, Rationality in economics: constructivist and ecological forms
by Maria Paganelli
March 2011, Volume 22, Issue 1
- 1-20 Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy
by Viktor Vanberg - 21-57 Enfranchisement from a political perspective
by Soumyanetra Munshi - 58-82 A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens
by George Tridimas - 83-102 A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization
by Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach
December 2010, Volume 21, Issue 4
- 309-335 Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries
by Thushyanthan Baskaran - 336-359 Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights
by Feler Bose - 360-373 The problem of political calculation in autocracies
by Sherzod Abdukadirov - 374-406 The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England
by Mark Koyama - 407-413 Gerald Berk: Louis D. Brandeis and the making of regulated competition, 1900–1932
by Richard Adelstein
September 2010, Volume 21, Issue 3
- 207-230 Institutions and human development in the Latin American informal economy
by Roberto Dell’Anno - 231-248 Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries
by Dominik Enste - 249-269 Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States
by Ringa Raudla - 270-287 Understanding economic change: the impact of emotion
by Roberta Patalano - 288-307 Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament
by Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto
June 2010, Volume 21, Issue 2
- 101-118 Federalism and individual liberty
by C. Mantzavinos - 119-144 Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece
by George Tridimas - 145-170 Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning, market, and organizations
by Stefano Fiori - 171-201 Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence
by Lorenzo Sacconi & Marco Faillo - 202-205 Marion Fourcade: Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s
by Philippe Fontaine
March 2010, Volume 21, Issue 1
- 1-27 The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum
by Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart - 28-49 The ‘science-as-market’ analogy: a constitutional economics perspective
by Viktor Vanberg - 50-79 An index of political support for decentralization: the Spanish case
by Juan Molero & Isabel Rodríguez-Tejedo - 80-96 Relationships among democratic freedoms in the former Soviet Republics: a causality analysis
by Jac Heckelman