IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v36y2025i1d10.1007_s10602-024-09445-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Italian Constitutional Court and recentralization along the pendulum of regionalism

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Filippetti

    (National Research Council)

  • Sandro Rondinella

    (University of Calabria)

  • Fabrizio Tuzi

    (National Research Council)

Abstract

This paper employs a quantitative analysis of the disputes between central and regional government concerning the role of the Italian Constitutional Court, focusing on the context of decentralization initiated during the late 1990s. The econometric evidence demonstrates a significant decrease in favourable outcomes for regional governments following the process of recentralization, which was commenced by central government in 2011 in response to a major financial crisis. The results of this study support the perspective of a centralistic attitude of the courts in litigation concerning subnational governments and provide fresh insights into the role of the courts in the relationship between recentralization and major economic crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Filippetti & Sandro Rondinella & Fabrizio Tuzi, 2025. "The Italian Constitutional Court and recentralization along the pendulum of regionalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 95-121, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-024-09445-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-024-09445-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tanzi, Vito, 2008. "The future of fiscal federalism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-03, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Agnese Sacchi, 2020. "Fiscal stability during the Great Recession: putting decentralization design to the test," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(7), pages 919-930, July.
    3. Fabio Padovano, 2009. "The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 230-250, September.
    4. Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, 2003. "The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 319-333, December.
    5. Annamaria Nifo & Gaetano Vecchione, 2014. "Do Institutions Play a Role in Skilled Migration? The Case of Italy," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(10), pages 1628-1649, October.
    6. Patricia Popelier, 2017. "Federalism Disputes and the Behavior of Courts: Explaining Variation in Federal Courts’ Support for Centralization," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 47(1), pages 27-48.
    7. Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2018. "Correction to: Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 338-338, September.
    8. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    9. Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2018. "Is the Spanish Constitutional Court an instrument of the central government against the Autonomous Communities?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 317-337, September.
    10. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar & Veronica Grembi, 2013. "Judging under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-534, June.
    11. Tanzi, Vito, 2008. "The future of fiscal federalism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 705-712, September.
    12. Silvia Bolgherini, 2014. "Can Austerity Lead to Recentralisation? Italian Local Government during the Economic Crisis," South European Society and Politics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 193-214, April.
    13. Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra & Nadia Fiorino, 2003. "Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-70, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
    2. Garoupa, Nuno & Gili, Marian & Gómez Pomar, Fernando, 2021. "Loyalty to the party or loyalty to the party leader: Evidence from the Spanish Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo & Eduardo Sanz-Arcega, 2019. "Consensus and dissent in the resolution of conflicts of competence by the Spanish Constitutional Court: the role of federalism and ideology," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 305-330, December.
    4. Fabio Padovano, 2009. "The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 230-250, September.
    5. Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012. "Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-223.
    6. Amaral-Garcia Sofia & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-40, November.
    7. Garoupa, Nuno & Grembi, Veronica, 2015. "Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 32-45.
    8. López-Laborda, Julio & Rodrigo, Fernando & Sanz-Arcega, Eduardo, 2024. "No War of Courts in the protection of fundamental rights: The case of amparo appeals in Spain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    9. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez Pomar & Adrián Segura & Sheila Canudas, 2023. "Punishing terrorists in the Spanish Supreme Court: has ideology played any role?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-21, August.
    10. George Tridimas, 2010. "Constitutional judicial review and political insurance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 81-101, February.
    11. Matej Avbelj & Janez Šušteršič, 2019. "Conceptual Framework and Empirical Methodology for Measuring Multidimensional Judicial Ideology," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 129-159, June.
    12. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary," CESifo Working Paper Series 1260, CESifo.
    13. Alessandro Melcarne, 2017. "Careerism and judicial behavior," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 241-264, October.
    14. Costa-Font, Joan & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada, 2022. "Does devolution influence the choice and quality of public (vs private) health care?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 632-653.
    15. Ludek Kouba & Michal Mádr & Danuše Nerudová & Petr Rozmahel, 2015. "Policy Autonomy, Coordination or Harmonisation in the Persistently Heterogeneous European Union? WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 95," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58136, March.
    16. Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2020. "Elections and de facto expenditure decentralization in Canada," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 275-297, September.
    17. Barbara ERMINI & Raffaella SANTOLINI, 2013. "Does globalization matter on fiscal decentralization of OECD?," Working Papers 390, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    18. Joan Costa-Font & Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2019. "Regional Decentralisation and the Demand for Public Health Care," Studies on the Spanish Economy eee2019-41, FEDEA.
    19. Vito Tanzi, 2010. "Revenue Sharing Arrangements: Options and Relative Merits (The Mahbub ul Haq Memorial Lecture)," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 311-332.
    20. Benno Torgler, 2022. "The power of public choice in law and economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(5), pages 1410-1453, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-024-09445-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.