Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court
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- Fabio Padovano & Nadia Fiorino, 2011. "Strategic delegation and "judicial couples" in the Italian Constitutional Court," Post-Print halshs-00661513, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg & Feld, Lars P., 2015.
"Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators,"
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- Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015.
"Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court,"
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- Nadia FIORINO & Nicolas GAVOILLE & Fabio PADOVANO, 2014. "Rewarding Judicial Independance: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional court," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-06-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- Nadia Fiorino & Nicolas Gavoille & Fabio Padovano, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," Post-Print halshs-01183207, HAL.
- Alessandro Melcarne, 2017. "Careerism and judicial behavior," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 241-264, October.
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More about this item
KeywordsConstitutional Court; Agenda setting; Delegation; Judicial independence;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
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