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Judicial Independence and Party Politics in Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal

Author

Listed:
  • Sofia Amaral-Garcia
  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Veronica Grembi

Abstract

In this article we test to what extent Kelsenian‐type constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying the Portuguese constitutional court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Sofia Amaral-Garcia & Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, 2009. "Judicial Independence and Party Politics in Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/301515, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/301515
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fałkowski, Jan & Lewkowicz, Jacek, 2021. "Are Adjudication Panels Strategically Selected? The Case of Constitutional Court in Poland," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Lars Hornuf & Lars Klöhn, 2019. "Do judges hate speculators?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 147-169, April.
    3. Amaral-Garcia Sofia & Garoupa Nuno, 2017. "Judicial Behavior and Devolution at the Privy Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-40, November.
    4. Pierre Bentata & Romain Espinosa & Yolande Hiriart, 2019. "Correction Activities by France’s Supreme Courts and Control over their Dockets," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 169-204.
    5. Sofia Amaral‐Garcia & Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, 2009. "Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 381-404, June.
    6. Keren Weinshall‐Margel, 2011. "Attitudinal and Neo‐Institutional Models of Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(3), pages 556-586, September.
    7. repec:gig:joupla:v:6:y:2014:i:2:p:139-164 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dimitrova-Grajzl Valentina & Grajzl Peter & Zajc Katarina & Sustersic Janez, 2012. "Judicial Incentives and Performance at Lower Courts: Evidence from Slovenian Judge-Level Data," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 215-252, August.
    9. Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
    10. Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012. "Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-223.
    11. Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
    12. Nuno Garoupa & Marian Gili & Fernando Gómez‐Pomar, 2012. "Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 795-826, December.
    13. Lars Hornuf & Lars Klöhn, 2018. "Do Judges Hate Speculators?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7375, CESifo.
    14. Arlota Carolina & Garoupa Nuno, 2014. "Addressing Federal Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 1988–2010," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-32, July.
    15. Espinosa Romain, 2017. "Constitutional Judicial Behavior: Exploring the Determinants of the Decisions of the French Constitutional Council," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-41, July.
    16. Keren Weinshall & Udi Sommer & Ya'acov Ritov, 2018. "Ideological influences on governance and regulation: The comparative case of supreme courts," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 334-352, September.
    17. Jan Fałkowski & Jacek Lewkowicz, 2022. "In practice or just on paper? Some insights on using alphabetical rule to assign judges to cases," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 405-430, December.
    18. repec:gig:joupla:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:107-140 is not listed on IDEAS

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