IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00661513.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategic delegation and "judicial couples" in the Italian Constitutional Court

Author

Listed:
  • Fabio Padovano

    () (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nadia Fiorino

Abstract

We analyze the selection of the Justice Reporter by the Justice President of the Italian Constitutional Court, the most important form of agenda setting power and act of delegation in decisions of constitutional (il)legitimacy. We estimate a series of econometric models that evaluate the relative importance of the determinants of the creation of these "judicial couples", namely, professional background, political affiliation, age, etc. Professional background is shown to be an important determinant of the creation of the couples, more so with time, although the onset of the Second Republic has reduced its importance. This analysis sheds light into the inner workings of the Italian Constitutional Court and the actual processes through which its jurisprudence is generated.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Padovano & Nadia Fiorino, 2011. "Strategic delegation and "judicial couples" in the Italian Constitutional Court," Post-Print halshs-00661513, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00661513
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.01.002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00661513
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fabio Padovano, 2009. "The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 230-250, September.
    2. Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, 2004. "Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 209-235, March.
    3. Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, 2003. "The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 319-333, December.
    4. Cohen, Mark A., 1992. "The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 13-30, March.
    5. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 1999. "Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses," Law and Economics 9907003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
    7. Ramseyer, J. Mark, 2001. "Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(2), pages 331-344, June.
    8. Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini, 2004. "Does Policy Stability Increase the Constitutional Court's Independence? The Case of Italy During the First Republic (1956--1992)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(3_4), pages 439-401, 09.
    9. Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1991. "Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 131-146, January.
    10. Salzberger, Eli & Fenn, Paul, 1999. "Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 831-847, October.
    11. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 2001. "Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 53-88, January.
    12. Ramseyer, J Mark & Rasmusen, Eric B, 1997. "Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 259-286, October.
    13. Fabio Padovano & Grazia Sgarra & Nadia Fiorino, 2003. "Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-70, March.
    14. Anderson, Gary M & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1989. "On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 215-228, April.
    15. Raphaël Franck, 2009. "Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study of the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959--2006," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 262-284, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg & Feld, Lars P., 2015. "Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 197-211.
    2. Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
    3. Alessandro Melcarne, 2017. "Careerism and judicial behavior," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 241-264, October.
    4. Garoupa, Nuno & Grembi, Veronica, 2015. "Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 32-45.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional Court; Agenda setting; Delegation; Judicial independence;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00661513. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.