Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?
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- Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer, 2009.
"Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice,"
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 47-78.
- Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer, 2008. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice," Working Papers 2008-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-126, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Mongrain, Steeve & Roberts, Joanne, 2009. "Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 8-12, March.
- Huang, Kuo-Chang & Chen, Kong-Pin & Lin, Chang-Ching, 2010. "Does the type of criminal defense counsel affect case outcomes?: A natural experiment in Taiwan," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 113-127, June.
- Christmann, Robin, 2018. "Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight Bias in Adversary Legal Systems," MPRA Paper 84870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, 2004. "Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers—An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 209-235, March.
- Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015.
"Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
- Nadia FIORINO & Nicolas GAVOILLE & Fabio PADOVANO, 2014. "Rewarding Judicial Independance: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional court," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-06-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
- Nadia Fiorino & Nicolas Gavoille & Fabio Padovano, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," Post-Print halshs-01183207, HAL.
- Nakao Keisuke & Tsumagari Masatoshi, 2012. "Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-14, October.
- Manu Raghav, 2006. "Why do budgets received by state prosecutors vary across districts in the United States?," Caepr Working Papers 2006-018, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012.
"Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
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- Fabio Padovano & Nadia Fiorino, 2011. "Strategic delegation and "judicial couples" in the Italian Constitutional Court," Post-Print halshs-00661513, HAL.
- Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004.
"Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1260, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200429, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- repec:clg:wpaper:2009-05 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsJapan; judges; political economy; prosecutors; convictions;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
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