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Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice System

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  • Boylan, Richard T

Abstract

The effect of salaries on turnover and performance is analyzed for U.S. attorneys in office during the years 1969 through 1999. Lower salaries are shown to increase the turnover of U.S. attorneys, and higher turnover is shown to reduce output. Two features distinguish U.S. attorneys (chief federal prosecutors) from other public- and private-sector employees. First, since 1977, U.S. attorney salaries have been tied to the salaries of members of Congress and are thus exogenously determined. Second, there are public measures for the output of U.S. attorneys. Both features simplify the study of the effect of salaries on turnover and performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Boylan, Richard T, 2004. "Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 75-92, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2004:v:47:i:1:p:75-92
    DOI: 10.1086/378695
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamie Bologna Pavlik, 2017. "Political importance and its relation to the federal prosecution of public corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 346-372, December.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2014. "Queuing Up For Justice: Elections and Case Backlogs," Discussion Papers 14-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    3. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
    4. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer, 2009. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 47-78.
    5. Garoupa, Nuno, 2009. "Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-28, March.
    6. Thomas J. Miles, 2012. "Racial Disparities in Wiretap Applications before Federal Judges," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 419-458.
    7. Robert S. Huckman & Jason Barro, 2005. "Cohort Turnover and Productivity: The July Phenomenon in Teaching Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 11182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Manu Raghav, 2006. "Why do budgets received by state prosecutors vary across districts in the United States?," CAEPR Working Papers 2006-018, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.

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