Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory vs. selective prosecution
Mandatory prosecution is inefficient according to legal economists. We argue that when prosecutors are fairly insulated from their performance or are highly risk-averse mandatory prosecution is better than selective prosecution. This result has important implications for comparative law. We use our findings to provide a positive explanation for the stylized fact that mandatory prosecution generally prevails in civil law jurisdictions whereas selective prosecution is typical of common law jurisdictions.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988.
"Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September.
- Shepherd, Joanna M, 2002. "Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 509-34, October.
- Hyun Song Shin, 1998.
"Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 378-405, Summer.
- Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," CEPR Discussion Papers 1722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Song Shin, H, 1996. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," Economics Papers 124, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February.
- Richard T. Boylan, 2005. "What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 379-402.
- Anne Van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2004.
"The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework,"
Constitutional Political Economy,
Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 261-280, 09.
- Anne van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2003. "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch. A Conceptual Framework," ICER Working Papers 32-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- David Bjerk, 2004.
"Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
2004-12, McMaster University.
- Bjerk, David, 2005. "Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 591-625, October.
- Boylan, Richard T, 2004. "Salaries, Turnover, and Performance in the Federal Criminal Justice System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 75-92, April.
- Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer, 2009.
"Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice,"
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 47-78.
- Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer, 2008. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice," Working Papers 2008-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Manu Raghav, 2006.
"Why do budgets received by state prosecutors vary across districts in the United States?,"
Caepr Working Papers
2006-018, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Manu Raghav, 2014. "Why do Budgets Received by State Prosecutors Vary Across Districts in the United States?," Working Papers 2014-01, DePauw University, Department of Economics and Management.
- Palumbo, Giuliana, 2006.
"Optimal duplication of effort in advocacy systems,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 112-128, May.
- Landes, William M, 1971.
"An Economic Analysis of the Courts,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
- Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, 1998. "Does it matter that the prosecutor is also the judge? The administrative complaint process at the Federal Trade Commission," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(1), pages 1-11.
- Boylan, Richard T & Long, Cheryl X, 2005. "Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 627-51, October.
- Parisi, Francesco, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-216, August.
- Nuno Garoupa & Frank H Stephen, 2008. "Why plea-bargaining fails to achieve results in so many criminal justice systems: A new framework for assessment," Working Papers 2008-02, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2008.
"Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator,"
MAGKS Papers on Economics
200801, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator," CESifo Working Paper Series 2245, CESifo Group Munich.
- Boari, Nicola & Fiorentini, Gianluca, 2001. "An economic analysis of plea bargaining: the incentives of the parties in a mixed penal system," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 213-231, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:1:p:25-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.