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The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials

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  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
  • Bryan C McCannon

Abstract

We examine if elections of public prosecutors (as is common in the U.S.) influence the way they handle cases. In particular, does it affect which cases are taken to trial? A theoretical model is constructed where voters use outcomes of the criminal justice system as a signal of prosecutor's quality. This leads to a distortion of the mix of cases they take to trial. Our results imply that when re-election pressures are high (i) prosecutors take too many cases to trial. This increases the number of convictions from trial and reduces the amount of plea bargaining so that (ii) the proportion of convictions stemming from trial increases. Consequently, (iii) the average sanction obtained in both jury trials and plea bargains decreases. A detailed dataset from North Carolina is used to identify empirical evidence of such distortions. Our empirical findsings verify that elections do affect the decision of which cases to take to trial and confirms our predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials," Discussion Papers 11-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:11-08
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    1. SIDDHARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY & BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2015. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 219-256, April.
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    7. Bryan C. McCannon, 2013. "Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 696-714, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    elections; prosectutor; trials;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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