Some reflections on the economics of prosecutors: Mandatory v selective prosecution
Mandatory prosecution is inefficient according to legal economists. We argue that when prosecutors are fairly insulated from their performance or are highly risk averse mandatory prosecution is better than selective prosecution. This result has important implications for comparative law since mandatory prosecution generally prevails in civil law jurisdictions whereas selective prosecution is typical of common law jurisdictions.
|Date of creation:||07 Feb 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in International Review of Law and Economics|
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