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Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure

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  • Dhammika Dharmapala
  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Richard H. McAdams

Abstract

Criminal law enforcement depends on public agents such as police officers, but the resulting agency problems are generally neglected. We develop an agency model of police behavior that emphasizes intrinsic motivation and self-selection. Drawing on experimental evidence on heterogeneous preferences for punishment, our model identifies circumstances in which punitive individuals (with stronger-than-average punishment preferences) self-select into law enforcement jobs that offer the opportunity to punish, or facilitate the punishment of, wrongdoers. Punitive agents accept a lower salary but create agency costs associated with excessive zeal in searching, seizing, and punishing suspects. In our framework, the public may choose to hire punitive police agents while providing suspects with criminal procedure protections, thereby empowering other agents (judges and juries) with average punishment preferences to limit the agency costs of excessive zeal. Intrinsic motivation and self-selection provide an explanation for the bifurcated structure of criminal law enforcement and pro-defendant rules of criminal procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2016. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 105-141.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/684308
    DOI: 10.1086/684308
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    Cited by:

    1. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, 2019. "Collective Bargaining and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida," CESifo Working Paper Series 7718, CESifo.
    2. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 377-412.
    3. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2018. "On the role of the exclusionary rule for optimal law enforcement effort," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 757-767, October.
    4. Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Zhiyong (John) Liu & Zhewei Wang & Zhendong Yin, 2022. "When is duplication of effort a good thing in law enforcement?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 682-708, August.
    6. Florian Baumann & Sophie Bienenstock & Tim Friehe & Maiva Ropaul, 2023. "Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 229-255, September.
    7. Wolfgang Maennig & Stefan Wilhelm, 2023. "Crime Prevention Effects of Data Retention Policies," Working Papers 074, Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg.
    8. Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 141-157, February.
    9. Gregory DeAngelo & Matthew Gomies & Rustam Romaniuc, 2023. "Do civilian complaints against police get punished?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 453-482, September.
    10. Olugbenga Ajilore & Shane Shirey, 2017. "Do #AllLivesMatter? An Evaluation of Race and Excessive Use of Force by Police," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 201-212, June.
    11. Saltiel, Fernando & Tuttle, Cody, 2022. "Business Cycles and Police Hires," IZA Discussion Papers 15665, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Ajilore, Olugbenga, 2017. "Is There a 1033 Effect? Police Militarization and Aggressive Policing," MPRA Paper 82543, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Fernando Saltiel & Cody Tuttle, 2023. "Business Cycles and Police Hires," Working Papers 288, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    14. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Private law enforcement with competing groups," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 285-297, August.

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    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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