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Free-riding on altruistic punishment? An experimental comparison of third-party-punishment in a stand-alone and in an in-group environment

  • Lewisch Peter
  • Ottone, Stefania

    ()

  • Ponzano, Ferruccio

    ()

This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate introduction of a second potential punisher is neither subtle nor marginal. Shifting punishment choices into this "enlarged environment" allows us to study, in a systematic way, the complex relationship between the punisher's expectations about her/his peer's punishment decisions and her/his own punishment choices. In particular, we aim to examine whether, on average, individual punishment is systematically lower in an In-Group environment compared with the Stand-Alone case.

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File URL: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/ottone159.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 139.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:139
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Ottone, Stefania, 2007. "Are people samaritans or avengers?," POLIS Working Papers 77, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:10:p:1-3 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Casari, Marco & Luini, Luigi, 2005. "Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1176, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  4. Ottone, Stefania, 2005. "Transfers and Altruistic Punishments in Solomon's Game experiments," POLIS Working Papers 50, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  5. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  6. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Third-party punishment and social norms," Experimental 0409002, EconWPA.
  7. Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "The demand for punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 522-542, April.
  10. Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
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