Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2016.
"Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 105-141.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2015. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5310, CESifo Group Munich.
- John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dima Yazji Shamoun & Bruce Yandle, 2016. "Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 87-111, January.
- Mueller Hannes, 2015. "Insulation or Patronage: Political Institutions and Bureaucratic Efficiency," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 961-996, July.
- Pedro P. Barros & Steffen H. Hoernig, 2018.
"Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 451-472, May.
- Barros, Pedro Pita & Hoernig, Steffen, 2004. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Berno Buechel & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2016.
"Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 331-366.
- Berno Buechel & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2014. "Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 4698, CESifo Group Munich.
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