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Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees

Author

Listed:
  • Li Hao
  • Wing Suen

Abstract

This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision-making. A committee consists of self-interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre-specified decision rule. We focus on costly information acquisition, strategic information aggregation, and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision. Seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision-making process such as over-cautiousness, voting, and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2009. "Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 359-392, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:42:y:2009:i:2:p:359-392
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Inukai, Keigo & Kawata, Keisuke & Sasaki, Masaru, 2017. "Committee Search with Ex-ante Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 10760, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    3. Schmid, Eva & Knopf, Brigitte, 2012. "Ambitious mitigation scenarios for Germany: A participatory approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 662-672.
    4. Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "Hierarchies Versus Committees: Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 62-88, March.
    5. Parés, Claudio & Dresdner, Jorge & Salgado, Hugo, 2015. "Who should set the total allowable catch? Social preferences and legitimacy in fisheries management institutions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 36-43.
    6. Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Working Paper Series in Economics 47, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
    7. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    8. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
    9. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    10. repec:eee:jcecon:v:45:y:2017:i:4:p:685-711 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:430-443 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Volker Hahn, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-24, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    13. Rune Midjord & Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer & Justin Valasek, 2013. "Over-Caution of Large Committees of Experts," Discussion Paper Series dp654, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    14. Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2013. "Institutions, shared guilt, and moral transgression," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-305, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    15. Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2016. "Preferences and Social Influence," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 912, Boston College Department of Economics.
    16. repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1716 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Freimuth, Claudia & Oelmann, Mark & Amann, Erwin, 2018. "Development and prospects of standardization in the German municipal wastewater sector: Version 1.0," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 223, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
    18. Szech, Nora & Rothenhäusler, Dominik & Schweizer, Nikolaus, 2014. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100518, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Strategic disclosure of feasible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 145-165.
    20. Dominik Rothenhäusler & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech, 2015. "Institutions, Shared Guilt, and Moral Transgression," CESifo Working Paper Series 5525, CESifo Group Munich.
    21. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0546-6 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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