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Patrick L. Warren

Personal Details

First Name:Patrick
Middle Name:L.
Last Name:Warren
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwa485
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://people.clemson.edu/~pwarren/
Terminal Degree:2008 Economics Department; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

John E. Walker Department of Economics
College of Business and Behavioral Science
Clemson University

Clemson, South Carolina (United States)
https://www.clemson.edu/business/departments/economics/
RePEc:edi:decleus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Darren L. Linvill & Patrick L. Warren, 2023. "Paths to Influence: How Coordinated Influence Operations Affect the Prominence of Ideas," Papers 2308.09818, arXiv.org.
  2. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Outsourcing Intensity and Ownership: Theory and Evidence from California General Care Hospitals," MPRA Paper 61949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Patrick Warren & Tom Wilkening, 2010. "Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1113, The University of Melbourne.

Articles

  1. Michael D. Makowsky & Patrick L. Warren, 2023. "Firearms and Lynching," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(2), pages 259-278.
  2. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2020. "An Equilibrium Theory of Retirement Plan Design," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 22-45, May.
  3. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2016. "Cost versus control: Understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
  4. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 95-135.
  5. Patrick L. Warren & Daniel H. Wood, 2014. "The Political Economy Of Regulation In Markets With Naïve Consumers," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(6), pages 1617-1642, December.
  6. Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 395-421, June.
  7. Cordis, Adriana S. & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Sunshine as disinfectant: The effect of state Freedom of Information Act laws on public corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 18-36.
  8. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang & Patrick L Warren, 2013. "Party Politics, Governors, and Economic Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 106-126, July.
  9. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Allies and Adversaries: Appointees and Policymaking Under Separation of Powers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 407-446, August.
  10. Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.
  11. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Volunteer Militaries, The Draft, and Support for War," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 227-258, November.
  12. Warren, Patrick L. & Wilkening, Tom S., 2012. "Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 840-856.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Outsourcing Intensity and Ownership: Theory and Evidence from California General Care Hospitals," MPRA Paper 61949, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Youngju Kang & Minyoung Kim & Kwangho Jung, 2020. "The Equity of Health Care Spending in South Korea: Testing the Impact of Publicness," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(5), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Singleton, John D., 2017. "Putting dollars before scholars? Evidence from for-profit charter schools in Florida," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 43-54.
    3. Afaf Haial & Loubna Benabbou & Abdelaziz Berrado, 2021. "Designing a Transportation-Strategy Decision-Making Process for a Supply Chain: Case of a Pharmaceutical Supply Chain," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(4), pages 1-29, February.
    4. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Bradford, W. David, 2019. "Better together: Coexistence of for-profit and nonprofit firms with an application to the U.S. hospice industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-18.
    5. Ian McCarthy & Sean Shenghsiu Huang, 2018. "Vertical Alignment Between Hospitals and Physicians as a Bargaining Response to Commercial Insurance Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(1), pages 7-29, August.
    6. Bernhard Eicher, 2016. "Selection of asset investment models by hospitals: examination of influencing factors, using Switzerland as an example," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 554-579, October.

Articles

  1. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2020. "An Equilibrium Theory of Retirement Plan Design," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 22-45, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Lucas Goodman & Anita Mukherjee & Shanthi Ramnath, 2022. "Set it and Forget it? Financing Retirement in an Age of Defaults," Working Paper Series WP 2022-50, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    2. Goodman, Lucas & Mukherjee, Anita & Ramnath, Shanthi, 2023. "Set it and forget it? Financing retirement in an age of defaults," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 47-68.
    3. Louis Kaplow, 2022. "Optimal Income Taxation," NBER Working Papers 30199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  2. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2016. "Cost versus control: Understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 95-135.

    Cited by:

    1. Berno Buechel & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2014. "Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 4698, CESifo.
    2. Brian D. Feinstein & Jennifer Nou, 2023. "Strategic subdelegation," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 746-817, December.
    3. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2015. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5310, CESifo.
    4. Hoernig, Steffen & Barros, Pedro, 2004. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Dima Yazji Shamoun & Bruce Yandle, 2016. "Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 87-111, January.
    6. Greg Sasso, 2020. "Delegation and political turnover," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 262-288, April.
    7. Mueller Hannes, 2015. "Insulation or Patronage: Political Institutions and Bureaucratic Efficiency," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 961-996, July.
    8. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Ian R Turner, 2017. "Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 69-96, January.
    10. Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking," SocArXiv ebp5m, Center for Open Science.
    11. Schram, Peter, 2021. "Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 240-257.

  4. Patrick L. Warren & Daniel H. Wood, 2014. "The Political Economy Of Regulation In Markets With Naïve Consumers," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(6), pages 1617-1642, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo.
    2. Yuri A. Kolesnikov & Tatiana V. Epifanova & Anastasia M. Usenko & Ekaterina Parshina & Victoria N. Ostrovskaya, 2016. "The Peculiarities of State Regulation of Innovation Activities of Enterprises in the Global Economy," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 10(4), December.
    3. Gottlieb, Daniel & Smetters, Kent, 2021. "Lapse-based insurance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110241, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Botond Köszegi, 2014. "Behavioral Contract Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1075-1118, December.
    5. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Meissner, Stefan & Tungodden, Bertil, 2023. "Cancel the deal? An experimental study on the exploitation of irrational consumers," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 6/2023, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    6. Heidhues, Paul & Köszegi, Botond, 2018. "Behavioral Industrial Organization," CEPR Discussion Papers 12988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Daniel Gottlieb & Kent Smetters, 2012. "Narrow Framing and Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 18601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  5. Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 395-421, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Claudia Allende & Juan Pablo Atal & Rodrigo Carril & Jose Ignacio Cuesta & Andrés González Lira, 2023. "Drivers of public procurement prices: Evidence from pharmaceutical markets," Economics Working Papers 1874, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Iossa, Elisabetta & Decarolis, Francesco & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Raiteri, Emilio & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 13777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2021. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Papers 2102.09625, arXiv.org.
    4. Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023. "Organizational capacity and project dynamics," Working Papers 339, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    5. Carril, Rodrigo & Duggan, Mark, 2020. "The impact of industry consolidation on government procurement: Evidence from Department of Defense contracting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    6. Seung Han Yoo, 2017. "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series 1702, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    7. Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes [“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 537-597.
    8. Olga Balaeva & Yuliya Rodionova & Andrei A. Yakovlev & Andrey Tkachenko, 2021. "Public Procurement Efficiency As Perceived By Market Participants: The Case Of Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 29/PSP/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Marina Cavalieri & Rossana Cristaudo & Livio Ferrante & Calogero Guccio, 2019. "Does the Project Design Matter for the Performance of Infrastructure Execution? An Assessment for Italy," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 5(1), pages 39-77, March.
    10. Boland, Matthew & Godsell, David, 2021. "Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    11. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules versus discretion in public procurement," Economics Working Papers 1765, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    12. Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Raiteri, Emilio, 2021. "Buyers' workload and R&D procurement outcomes: Evidence from the US Air Force Research Lab," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-059, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    13. Francesco Decarolis & Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Emilio Raiteri & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from US military R&D contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 697-720, November.
    14. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022. "Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 980-1019, November.

  6. Cordis, Adriana S. & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Sunshine as disinfectant: The effect of state Freedom of Information Act laws on public corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 18-36.

    Cited by:

    1. Hsien-Yi Chen & Sheng-Syan Chen, 2023. "Can credit default swaps exert an enduring monitoring influence on political integrity?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 445-469, February.
    2. Wang, Huanming & Ran, Bing, 2022. "How business-related governance strategies impact paths towards the formation of global cities? An institutional embeddedness perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    3. Chen, Xia & Jiang, Xuejun & Lu, Louise Yi & Yu, Yangxin, 2021. "Local political corruption and Firm's non-GAAP reporting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    4. Wu, Kai & Liu, Jiming, 2022. "Purifying political ecology: How anti-corruption campaign affects capital structure decisions?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    5. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Maria Tackett, 2022. "The Effect of Presidential Particularism on Economic Well-Being: A County-Level Analysis," Public Finance Review, , vol. 50(2), pages 135-168, March.
    6. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?," Working Papers 1301, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    7. Abel François & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2021. "Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt," Post-Print hal-03129928, HAL.
    8. Islam,Asif Mohammed & Lederman,Daniel, 2020. "Data Transparency and Long-Run Growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9493, The World Bank.
    9. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions," Working Papers 1322, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    10. Huai Zhang & Jin Zhang, 2023. "Political corruption and accounting choices," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3-4), pages 443-481, March.
    11. Theodora Bermpei & Antonios Nikolaos Kalyvas & Leone Leonida, 2021. "Local Public Corruption and Bank Lending Activity in the United States," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 73-98, June.
    12. Bertrand Venard & Kezang Tshering, 2021. "Barriers to transparency in Bhutan's public administration: A new typology of opacity," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 203-216, October.
    13. Casadesús de Mingo, Anahí & Cerrillo-i-Martínez, Agustí, 2018. "Improving records management to promote transparency and prevent corruption," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 256-261.
    14. Ding, Haoyuan & Qin, Cong & Shi, Kang, 2018. "Who benefit from government-led microfinance projects? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1253-1272.
    15. Noel Campbell & Adriana S. Cordis, 2014. "Expected corruption and business formation," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 3(2), pages 292-305, October.
    16. Samarth Vaidya & Rupayan Gupta, 2016. "Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(4), pages 1327-1348, April.
    17. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    18. Nicholas R. Jenkins & Michelangelo Landgrave & Gabriel E. Martinez, 2020. "Do political donors have greater access to government officials? Evidence from a FOIA field experiment with US municipalities," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 3(2).
    19. Calel, Raphael & Dechezlepretre, Antoine & Venmans, Frank, 2023. "Policing carbon markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120565, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  7. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang & Patrick L Warren, 2013. "Party Politics, Governors, and Economic Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 106-126, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Gordon, Steven, 2018. "What did the Earmark Ban Do? Evidence from Intergovernmental Grants," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), February.

  8. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Allies and Adversaries: Appointees and Policymaking Under Separation of Powers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 407-446, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 95-135.
    2. Yazaki, Yukihiro, 2018. "The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 57-68.
    3. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
    4. Sanghee Park & Byong Kim, 2014. "Who is Appointed to What Position? The Politics of Appointment in Quangos of Korea," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 325-351, September.

  9. Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.

    Cited by:

    1. Takanori Adachi & Yoichi Hizen, 2012. "Political Accountability, Electoral Control, and Media Bias," KIER Working Papers 811, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    3. Federico Vaccari, 2023. "Influential news and policy-making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1363-1418, November.
    4. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    5. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2015. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5310, CESifo.
    6. Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 266-279.
    7. Devdariani, Saba & Hirsch, Alexander V., 2023. "Voter attention and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    8. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
    9. Miura, Shintaro, 2019. "Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 306-338.
    10. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2013. "Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration," CREMA Working Paper Series 2013-12, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    11. Alexander V. Hirsch & Jonathan P. Kastellec, 2022. "A theory of policy sabotage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 191-218, April.
    12. Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption," Discussion Papers 2012-21A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    13. Betul Demirkaya, 2019. "What is opposition good for?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(2), pages 260-280, April.
    14. Patacconi, Andrea & Vikander, Nick, 2015. "A model of public opinion management," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 73-83.
    15. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2022. "Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics: The role of naïve voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 78-106, January.

  10. Warren, Patrick L. & Wilkening, Tom S., 2012. "Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 840-856.

    Cited by:

    1. Michel Berthélemy & Petyo Bonev & Damien Dussaux & Magnus Söderberg, 2018. "Methods for strengthening a weak instrument in the case of a persistent treatment," Post-Print hal-01829558, HAL.
    2. Michael Collins, J. & Urban, Carly, 2014. "The dark side of sunshine: Regulatory oversight and status quo bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PB), pages 470-486.
    3. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2015-02-28

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