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Patrick L. Warren

Personal Details

First Name:Patrick
Middle Name:L.
Last Name:Warren
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwa485
http://people.clemson.edu/~pwarren/
Terminal Degree:2008 Economics Department; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

John E. Walker Department of Economics
College of Business and Behavioral Science
Clemson University

Clemson, South Carolina (United States)
https://www.clemson.edu/business/departments/economics/
RePEc:edi:decleus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Outsourcing Intensity and Ownership: Theory and Evidence from California General Care Hospitals," MPRA Paper 61949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Patrick Warren & Tom Wilkening, 2010. "Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1113, The University of Melbourne.

Articles

  1. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2016. "Cost versus control: Understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
  2. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 95-135.
  3. Patrick L. Warren & Daniel H. Wood, 2014. "The Political Economy Of Regulation In Markets With Naïve Consumers," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(6), pages 1617-1642, December.
  4. Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 395-421, June.
  5. Cordis, Adriana S. & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Sunshine as disinfectant: The effect of state Freedom of Information Act laws on public corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 18-36.
  6. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang & Patrick L Warren, 2013. "Party Politics, Governors, and Economic Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 106-126, July.
  7. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Allies and Adversaries: Appointees and Policymaking Under Separation of Powers," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 407-446, August.
  8. Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.
  9. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Volunteer Militaries, The Draft, and Support for War," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 227-258, November.
  10. Warren, Patrick L. & Wilkening, Tom S., 2012. "Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 840-856.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Outsourcing Intensity and Ownership: Theory and Evidence from California General Care Hospitals," MPRA Paper 61949, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Bradford, W. David, 2019. "Better together: Coexistence of for-profit and nonprofit firms with an application to the U.S. hospice industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-18.
    2. Ian McCarthy & Sean Shenghsiu Huang, 2018. "Vertical Alignment Between Hospitals and Physicians as a Bargaining Response to Commercial Insurance Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(1), pages 7-29, August.
    3. Bernhard Eicher, 2016. "Selection of asset investment models by hospitals: examination of influencing factors, using Switzerland as an example," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 554-579, October.
    4. Singleton, John D., 2017. "Putting dollars before scholars? Evidence from for-profit charter schools in Florida," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 43-54.

Articles

  1. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2016. "Cost versus control: Understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 95-135.

    Cited by:

    1. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Dima Yazji Shamoun & Bruce Yandle, 2016. "Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 87-111, January.
    3. Berno Buechel & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2014. "Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 4698, CESifo.
    4. Pedro P. Barros & Steffen H. Hoernig, 2018. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(3), pages 451-472, May.
    5. Greg Sasso, 2020. "Delegation and political turnover," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 262-288, April.
    6. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2015. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5310, CESifo.
    7. Mueller Hannes, 2015. "Insulation or Patronage: Political Institutions and Bureaucratic Efficiency," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 961-996, July.

  3. Patrick L. Warren & Daniel H. Wood, 2014. "The Political Economy Of Regulation In Markets With Naïve Consumers," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(6), pages 1617-1642, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Botond Köszegi, 2014. "Behavioral Contract Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1075-1118, December.
    2. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo.
    3. Heidhues, Paul & Köszegi, Botond, 2018. "Behavioral Industrial Organization," CEPR Discussion Papers 12988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Yuri A. Kolesnikov & Tatiana V. Epifanova & Anastasia M. Usenko & Ekaterina Parshina & Victoria N. Ostrovskaya, 2016. "The Peculiarities of State Regulation of Innovation Activities of Enterprises in the Global Economy," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 10(4), December.
    5. Daniel Gottlieb & Kent Smetters, 2012. "Narrow Framing and Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 18601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  4. Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 395-421, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo Carril & Mark Duggan, 2018. "The Impact of Industry Consolidation on Government Procurement: Evidence from Department of Defense Contracting," NBER Working Papers 25160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. De Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Decarolis, Francesco & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Iossa, Elisabetta & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Raiteri, Emilio & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 13777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Seung Han Yoo, 2017. "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series 1702, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    4. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules Versus Discretion in Public Procurement," Working Papers 1232, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Olga Balaeva & Yuliya Rodionova & Andrei A. Yakovlev & Andrey Tkachenko, 2021. "Public Procurement Efficiency As Perceived By Market Participants: The Case Of Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 29/PSP/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2021. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Papers 2102.09625, arXiv.org.
    7. Marina Cavalieri & Rossana Cristaudo & Livio Ferrante & Calogero Guccio, 2019. "Does the Project Design Matter for the Performance of Infrastructure Execution? An Assessment for Italy," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 5(1), pages 39-77, March.
    8. Boland, Matthew & Godsell, David, 2021. "Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    9. Decarolis, Francesco & Giuffrida, Leonardo & Iossa, Elisabetta & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

  5. Cordis, Adriana S. & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Sunshine as disinfectant: The effect of state Freedom of Information Act laws on public corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 18-36.

    Cited by:

    1. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    2. Nicholas R. Jenkins & Michelangelo Landgrave & Gabriel E. Martinez, 2020. "Do political donors have greater access to government officials? Evidence from a FOIA field experiment with US municipalities," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 3(2).
    3. Abel François & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2020. "Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt," Post-Print hal-03129928, HAL.
    4. Theodora Bermpei & Antonios Nikolaos Kalyvas & Leone Leonida, 2021. "Local Public Corruption and Bank Lending Activity in the United States," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 73-98, June.
    5. Ding, Haoyuan & Qin, Cong & Shi, Kang, 2018. "Who benefit from government-led microfinance projects? Evidence from rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1253-1272.
    6. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions," Working Papers 1322, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    7. Noel Campbell & Adriana S. Cordis, 2014. "Expected corruption and business formation," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 3(2), pages 292-305, October.

  6. Patrick L. Warren, 2012. "Allies and Adversaries: Appointees and Policymaking Under Separation of Powers," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 407-446, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Yazaki, Yukihiro, 2018. "The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 57-68.
    2. Sanghee Park & Byong Kim, 2014. "Who is Appointed to What Position? The Politics of Appointment in Quangos of Korea," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 325-351, September.
    3. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.

  7. Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.

    Cited by:

    1. Miura, Shintaro, 2019. "Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 306-338.
    2. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2013. "Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration," CREMA Working Paper Series 2013-12, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Takanori Adachi & Yoichi Hizen, 2012. "Political Accountability, Electoral Control, and Media Bias," KIER Working Papers 811, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    4. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    5. Vaccari, Federico, 2020. "Influential News and Policy-making," MPRA Paper 100464, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    7. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa & Richard H. McAdams, 2015. "Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5310, CESifo.
    8. Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption," Discussion Papers 2012-21A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    9. Patacconi, Andrea & Vikander, Nick, 2015. "A model of public opinion management," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 73-83.
    10. Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 266-279.
    11. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.

  8. Warren, Patrick L. & Wilkening, Tom S., 2012. "Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 840-856.

    Cited by:

    1. Michel Berthélemy & Petyo Bonev & Damien Dussaux & Magnus Söderberg, 2018. "Methods for strengthening a weak instrument in the case of a persistent treatment," Post-Print hal-01829558, HAL.
    2. Michael Collins, J. & Urban, Carly, 2014. "The dark side of sunshine: Regulatory oversight and status quo bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PB), pages 470-486.
    3. Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.

More information

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Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2015-02-28

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