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Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt

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  • François, Abel
  • Méon, Pierre-Guillaume

Abstract

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries.

Suggested Citation

  • François, Abel & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2021. "Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:67:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020301105
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101962
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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Monnery & Alexandre Chirat, 2023. "Trust in the fight against political corruption: A survey experiment among citizens and experts," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-11, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Henri Njangang & Simplice A. Asongu & Eric Mouchili, 2022. "Does corruption starve? An African perspective," Working Papers 22/022, European Xtramile Centre of African Studies (EXCAS).
    3. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2023. "In the Light of Dynamic Competition: Should We Make Merger Remedies More Flexible?," Working Papers AFED 23-01, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    4. Abel François & Nicolas Lagios & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2023. "Jurisdiction size and perceived corruption," Working Papers CEB 23-003, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Benjamin Monnery & Alexandre Chirat, 2024. "Trust in the Fight Against Political Corruption: A Survey Experiment among Citizens and Experts," Working Papers AFED 24-02, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    6. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L. & Qijun, LIU, 2020. "Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Levels of government; Decentralization; Federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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