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Constitutional determinants of government spending

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  • Guido Tabellini

Abstract

This paper surveys some recent literature on fiscal policy and comparative politics. Economic policy is viewed as the outcome of a game with multiple-principals and multiple-agents. Opportunistic politicians bargain over policy. Rational voters hold them accountable through retrospective voting. Political institutions determine the rules for legislative bargaining and for electing politicians to office. The questions asked are: how do alternative electoral rules and alternative regime types shape the size of government, the composition of spending, the performance of politicians in terms of effort or corruption, the features of electoral cycles. The paper discusses both theory and evidence, and concludes with some speculations about directions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Constitutional determinants of government spending," Working Papers 162, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:162
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    1. Cao, Chunfang & Li, Xiaoyang & Xia, Changyuan, 2021. "The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Jürgen von Hagen, 2002. "Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(3), pages 263-284.
    3. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
    4. Nishijima, Marislei & Ellis, Randall P. & Cati, Regina C., 2022. "Primary healthcare effects of a well-designed anti-corruption program," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 25(C).
    5. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi & Claudia Cantabene, 2014. "The Effect of the Decentralization Degree on Corruption: A New Interpretation," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2014/10, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    6. Hagen, Jürgen von, 2005. "Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 149, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Andreas Kyriacou & Oriol Roca sagalés, 2009. "Fiscal descentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 189(2), pages 131-155, June.
    8. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Romero-Ávila, Diego & Usabiaga, Carlos, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 205-231.
    9. Marco Alderighi & Christophe Feder, 2014. "Political competition, power allocation and welfare in unitary and federal systems," Working Paper series 23_14, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
    10. Yener AltunbaÅŸ & John Thornton, 2012. "Fiscal Decentralization and Governance," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(1), pages 66-85, January.
    11. Alessandro Olper, 2001. "Determinants of Agricultural Protection: The Role of Democracy and Institutional Setting Alessandro Olper," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 75-92, May.
    12. Afonso, António & Alves, José & Jalles, João Tovar & Monteiro, Sofia, 2024. "Beyond the centre: Tracing Decentralization's influence on time-varying fiscal sustainability," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA).
    13. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2010. "One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 631-646, April.
    14. François, Abel & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2021. "Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    15. López-Valcárcel, Beatriz G. & Jiménez, Juan Luis & Perdiguero, Jordi, 2017. "Danger: Local corruption is contagious!," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 790-808.
    16. Mongi Lassoued, 2021. "Control of corruption, microfinance, and income inequality in MENA countries: evidence from panel data," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(7), pages 1-19, July.
    17. Abel François & Nicolas Lagios & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2025. "Jurisdiction size and perceived corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 202(1), pages 251-275, January.
    18. Wayne Eastman & Deirdre Collier, 2012. "The Optimal Bargain between the Elite and the Majority: Party and Managerial Ideologies as Devices to Control Politicians and Managers," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 475-494, July.
    19. Kathleen Bawn & Frances Rosenbluth, 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 251-265, April.
    20. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Espinoza, Raphael & Zhang, Xiaoxiao, 2019. "Globalization, Redistribution, and the Size of Government," CEPR Discussion Papers 14137, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Oguzhan Dincer, 2010. "Fiscal Decentralization and Trust," Public Finance Review, , vol. 38(2), pages 178-192, March.

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