IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?

  • Oto-Peralías, Daniel
  • Romero-Ávila, Diego
  • Usabiaga, Carlos

Corruption is harmful for public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. We open a new avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal decentralization. For a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986–2010, we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate diversity in the effects of fiscal decentralization, in that it appears related to lower deficits in countries with higher levels of corruption but not in less corrupt countries. Our results suggest that bringing the government closer to the people through fiscal decentralization in relatively corrupt countries leads to more responsible fiscal management.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268013000608
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 32 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 205-231

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:205-231
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bilin Neyapti, 2008. "Fiscal Decentralization and Deficits : International Evidence," Working Papers 0802, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
  2. Francesca Fornasari & Steven B. Webb & Heng-fu Zou, 2000. "The Macroeconomic Impact of Decentralized Spending and Deficits: International Evidence," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 403-433, November.
  3. Toke Aidt & Jayasri Dutta & Vania Sena, 2006. "Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 15_2006, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
  4. Jean, HINDRIKS & Ben, Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Mar 2005.
  5. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Roberto Ezcurra, 2010. "Is fiscal decentralization harmful for economic growth?: evidence from the OECD countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 30796, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
  7. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
  8. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 2003. "Fractionalization," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 155-94, June.
  9. Friedrich Schneider & Andreas Buehn & Claudio E. Montenegro, 2010. "Shadow Economies All over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007," Working Papers wp322, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  10. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2008. "One size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucrats," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 14/08, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  11. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2007. "Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 768-776, September.
  12. de Mello, Luiz Jr, 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 365-380, February.
  13. Brezis, Elise S. & Weiss, Avi, 1997. "Conscientious regulation and post-regulatory employment restrictions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 517-536, September.
  14. Aidt, T.S., 2009. "Corruption, Institutions and Economic Development," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0918, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  15. William Dillinger & Steven B. Webb, 1999. "Fiscal management in federal democracies: Argentina and Brazil," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0(3), pages 423-483.
  16. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2011. "Tax decentralization and public deficits in OECD countries," MPRA Paper 35141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  18. Khemani, Stuti, 2001. "Decentralization and accountability : are voters more vigilant in local than in national elections ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2557, The World Bank.
  19. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008. "Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 133-150, March.
  20. Dillinger,William R. & Webb,Steven Benjamin, 1999. "Fiscal management in federal democracies : Argentina and Brazil," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2121, The World Bank.
  21. Richard Blundell & Steve Bond, 1995. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," IFS Working Papers W95/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  22. Sanjeev Gupta & Hamid Davoodi & Rosa Alonso-Terme, 2002. "Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 23-45, 03.
  23. Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2010. "Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 309-335, December.
  24. Oates, Wallace E., 2008. "On The Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 61(2), pages 313-34, June.
  25. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2007. "Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in Decentralized Governments?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1946, CESifo Group Munich.
  26. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Do fiscal decentralization and government fragmentation affect corruption in different ways? Evidence from a panel data analysis," Post-Print halshs-00908653, HAL.
  27. David Roodman, 2009. "A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(1), pages 135-158, 02.
  28. Guido Tabellini, . "Constitutional determinants of government spending," Working Papers 162, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  29. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2000. "Decentralization and corruption - evidence across countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2290, The World Bank.
  30. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
  31. J. Mark Payne & Carles Boix & Alícia Adserà, 2000. "Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6478, Inter-American Development Bank.
  32. Egger, Peter & Winner, Hannes, 2005. "Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 932-952, December.
  33. David Roodman, 2006. "How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to "Difference" and "System" GMM in Stata," Working Papers 103, Center for Global Development.
  34. Kappeler, Andreas & Välilä, Timo, 2008. "Fiscal federalism and the composition of public investment in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 562-570, September.
  35. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing Than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills," NBER Working Papers 6255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
  37. Anwar Shah, 2006. "Fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic management," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 437-462, August.
  38. Ivanyna, Maksym & Shah, Anwar, 2010. "Decentralization (localization) and corruption : new cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5299, The World Bank.
  39. Park, Hyun & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2005. "Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 830-850, December.
  40. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Nicholas Gill, 2003. "The global trend towards devolution and its implications," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 21(3), pages 333-351, June.
  41. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2009. "Supranational Integration And National Reorganization," MPRA Paper 21597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  42. G. Gulsun Arikan, 2004. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-195, 03.
  43. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2010. "The worldwide governance indicators : methodology and analytical issues," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5430, The World Bank.
  44. Rajkumar, Andrew Sunil & Swaroop, Vinaya, 2008. "Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 96-111, April.
  45. Craig Depken & Courtney Lafountain, 2006. "Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 75-85, January.
  46. World Bank, 2011. "World Development Indicators 2011," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2315, August.
  47. Fabian Valencia & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Systemic Banking Crises Database; An Update," IMF Working Papers 12/163, International Monetary Fund.
  48. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Lee, Sanghack & Lee, Shi Young, 2006. "The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 337-342, June.
  49. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
  50. Frederick Solt, 2009. "Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 90(2), pages 231-242.
  51. Dan Stegarescu, 2009. "The effects of economic and political integration on fiscal decentralization: evidence from OECD countries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 694-718, May.
  52. Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2010. "On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 351-378, December.
  53. Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & Rider, Mark & Walker, Mary Beth, 1997. "Race and the Structure of School Districts in the United States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 281-300, March.
  54. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012. "Revenue decentralization and inflation: A re-evaluation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 298-300.
  55. Dan Stegarescu, 2005. "Public sector decentralisation: measurement concepts and recent international trends," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 301-333, September.
  56. Ubogue, Roland Ekotome, 1983. "Urbanisation, fiscal decentralisation and economic development: A time series evidence," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 191-198.
  57. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
  58. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  59. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
  60. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
  61. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2009. "The social cost of rent seeking in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 280-299, September.
  62. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
  63. Baskaran, T., 2009. "Fiscal decentralization, ideology, and the size of the public sector," MPRA Paper 30188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  64. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.
  65. Fan, C. Simon & Lin, Chen & Treisman, Daniel, 2009. "Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 14-34, February.
  66. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
  67. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  68. Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 69-90, Fall.
  69. J. Stiglitz, 1999. "Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 7.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:205-231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.