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Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing Than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills

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  • Shang-Jin Wei

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of corruption-induced uncertainty on foreign direct" investment. The measure of uncertainty is constructed based on unpublished individual survey" responses on levels of corruption in host countries. The result is striking. The effect is negative statistically significant and quantitatively large. An increase in the uncertainty level from that of" Singapore to that of Mexico, at the average level of corruption in the sample raising the tax rate on multinational firms by 32 percentage points. Hence (uncertainty) effect can and does have first-order importance.

Suggested Citation

  • Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing Than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills," NBER Working Papers 6255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6255
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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