Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms
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- Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2486, The World Bank.
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TBA;JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2002-06-25 (Microeconomics)
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