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Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms

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  • Svensson, Jakob

    () (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)

Abstract

This paper uses an unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features; not all firms report they need to pay bribes; and, there is a considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. To explain these patterns we construct a simple bargaining model. The model yields predictions on both the incidence and the level of graft. Consistent with the model we find that variation in policies/regulations (across industries) explain the incidence of corruption, while variation in profitability and technology choice explain the variation in bribes for the group of bribe paying firms. These findings suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are endogenously determined in order to extract bribes.

Suggested Citation

  • Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Seminar Papers 713, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0713
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    14. repec:hrv:faseco:30728045 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Keywords

    TBA;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General

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