Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Levels of government; Decentralization; Federalism;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-03-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2018-03-05 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2018-03-05 (Public Finance)
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