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The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

  • Toke, A.S.
  • Albornoz, F.
  • Gassebner, M.

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1241.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1241.

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Date of creation: 08 Oct 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1241
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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  9. Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1997. "I just ran four million regressions," Economics Working Papers 201, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  10. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics," FMG Discussion Papers dp535, Financial Markets Group.
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  13. Congleton,Roger D., 2011. "Perfecting Parliament," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521764605, June.
  14. Markus Brückner, 2010. "Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity," 2010 Meeting Papers 224, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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  22. Toke S. Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2008. "On the Internalization of Cross-National Externalities through Political Markets: The Case of Labour Standards," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 509-533, September.
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  25. Vreeland,James Raymond, 2003. "The IMF and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016957, June.
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