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The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

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  • Axel Dreher

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  • Matthew Gould
  • Matthew Rablen
  • James Vreeland

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:1:p:51-83
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barthel, Fabian & Neumayer, Eric & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Selaya, Pablo, 2014. "Competition for Export Markets and the Allocation of Foreign Aid: The Role of Spatial Dependence among Donor Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 350-365.
    2. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Maya Schmaljohann, 2015. "The Allocation of German Aid: Self-interest and Government Ideology," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 160-184, March.
    3. Donaubauer, Julian & Meyer, Birgit & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2016. "Aid, Infrastructure, and FDI: Assessing the Transmission Channel with a New Index of Infrastructure," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 230-245.
    4. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    6. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2016. "Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 19-51, October.
    7. Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen, 2013. "Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application," CESifo Working Paper Series 4519, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Aidt, Toke S. & Albornoz, Facundo & Gassebner, Martin, 2018. "The golden hello and political transitions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 157-173.
    9. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    10. Dreher, Axel & Richert, Katharina, 2017. "The Political Economy of International Finance Corporation Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 12290, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2017. "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 145-168, October.
    12. repec:spr:revint:v:12:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11558-016-9254-z is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Kleemann, Linda & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2014. "Gender inequality, female leadership, and aid allocation: A panel analysis of aid for education," WIDER Working Paper Series 010, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    14. Gustavo Javier Canavire‐Bacarreza & Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2015. "Why Aid is Unpredictable: An Empirical Analysis of the Gap Between Actual and Planned Aid Flows," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 440-463, 05-27.
    15. Erik Voeten, 2014. "Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 285-308, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    United Nations; Security Council; Turn-taking norm; Elections; F53; F55; O19;

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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