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The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership

Author

Listed:
  • Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

    (Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University, NY, USA)

  • Alastair Smith

    (Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University, NY, USA, Alastair.Smith@nyu.edu)

Abstract

Nations elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as temporary members have lower levels of economic growth, become less democratic, and experience more restrictions on press freedoms than comparable nations not elected to the UNSC. Using regression and matching techniques the authors show, for instance, that over the two-year period of UNSC membership and the following two years during which a nation is ineligible for reelection, UNSC nations experience a 3.5 percent contraction in their economy relative to nations not elected to the UNSC. The detrimental effects of UNSC membership are strongest in nondemocratic nations. The authors contrast these results with the growing evidence that nations elected to the UNSC receive greater development assistance.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, 2010. "The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 667-686, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:5:p:667-686
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002710371670
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
    2. Axel Dreher & Vera Eichenauer & Kai Gehring & Vera Z. Eichenauer, 2013. "Geopolitics, Aid and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 4299, CESifo.
    3. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Maya Schmaljohann, 2015. "The Allocation of German Aid: Self-interest and Government Ideology," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 160-184, March.
    4. Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
    5. Dutta, Nabamita & Williamson, Claudia R., 2016. "Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 24-38.

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