IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ifwkwp/1275.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Dreher, Axel
  • Nunnenkamp, Peter
  • Thiele, Rainer

Abstract

Using panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2006. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Kiel Working Papers 1275, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1275
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/3811/1/kap1275.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer & Triveño, Luis, 2005. "Assessing the allocation of aid: Developmental concerns and the self-interest of donors," Kiel Working Papers 1253, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    2. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 224-240, May.
    3. Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson, 2006. "Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 55-73, April.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    6. P. Guillaumont & L. Chauvet, 2001. "Aid and Performance: A Reassessment," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(6), pages 66-92.
    7. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.
    8. Thiele, Rainer & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Dreher, Axel, 2006. "Sectoral aid priorities: Are donors really doing their best to achieve the millennium development goals?," Kiel Working Papers 1266, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    9. Kul B. Rai, 1980. "Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967—1976," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 17(3), pages 269-277, September.
    10. Harrigan, Jane & Wang, Chengang & El-Said, Hamed, 2006. "The economic and political determinants of IMF and world bank lending in the Middle East and North Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 247-270, February.
    11. David Roodman, 2004. "An Index of Donor Performance," Working Papers 42, Center for Global Development.
    12. P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, July.
    13. Hristos Doucouliagos & Martin Paldam, 2005. "The Aid Effectiveness Literature. The Sad Result of 40 Years of Research," Economics Working Papers 2005-15, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    14. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2004.
    15. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2005. "IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1245-1269, October.
    16. Glenn Palmer & Scott B. Wohlander & T. Clifton Morgan, 2002. "Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(1), pages 5-26, January.
    17. Philipp Harms & Matthias Lutz, 2004. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Foreign Aid: A Survey," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2004 2004-11, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    18. World Bank, 2006. "World Development Indicators 2006," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 8151, June.
    19. Rai, Kul B., 1972. "Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(03), pages 589-594, June.
    20. Rainer Thiele & Peter Nunnenkamp & Axel Dreher, 2007. "Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 143(4), pages 596-630, December.
    21. Oecd, 2004. "Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations," OECD Journal on Development, OECD Publishing, vol. 4(3), pages 7-40.
    22. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2007. "Democratic politics in the European Parliament," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7744, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    23. McGillivray, M. & White, H., 1993. "Explanatory studies of aid allocation among developing countries : a critical survey," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18942, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    24. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "Donor Influence in MDBs: the Case of the Asian Development Bank," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 70, Vassar College Department of Economics.
    25. Rolf J. Langhammer, 2004. "Halving Poverty by Doubling Aid: Is There Reason for Optimism?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 81-98, January.
    26. Abrams, Burton A & Lewis, Kenneth A, 1993. "Human Rights and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 815-821, December.
    27. Berthelemy, Jean-Claude & Tichit, Ariane, 2004. "Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions--a three-dimensional panel analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 253-274.
    28. Stone, Randall W., 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 577-591, November.
    29. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    30. Dollar, David & Levin, Victoria, 2004. "Increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2002," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3299, The World Bank.
    31. Monica Escaleras & Nejat Anbarci & Charles Register, 2007. "Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 209-230, July.
    32. Mark McGillivray, 2003. "Aid Effectiveness and Selectivity: Integrating Multiple Objectives into Aid Allocations," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2003-71, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    33. Wittkopf, Eugene R., 1973. "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 868-888, September.
    34. Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck & Harr, Thomas & Tarp, Finn, 2006. "On US politics and IMF lending," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1843-1862, October.
    35. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2002. "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1475-1500, September.
    36. Fleck, Robert K & Kilby, Christopher, 2002. "Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 31-53, July.
    37. Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer & Wilfer, Tom, 2005. "Grants versus loans: Much ado about (almost) nothing," Kiel Economic Policy Papers 4, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    38. Feyzioglu, Tarhan & Swaroop, Vinaya & Zhu, Min, 1998. "A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 12(1), pages 29-58, January.
    39. Hristos Doucouliagos & Martin Paldam, 2007. "A meta-analysis of development aid allocation: The effects of income level and population size," Economics Working Papers 2007-15, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    40. repec:zbw:ifwkie:3881 is not listed on IDEAS
    41. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    42. Morgenthau, Hans, 1962. "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 301-309, June.
    43. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    UN General Assembly; Voting; Bilateral Aid;

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1275. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iwkiede.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.