Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions
In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable economic indicators or, alternatively, whether it is partly driven by its major shareholder, the United States. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries from 4/1997-2/2003 reveals that the number of conditions on an IMF loan depends on a borrowing country’s voting pattern in the UN general assembly. Closer US allies receive IMF loans with fewer conditions especially prior to elections. Countries not allied with the US have to accept more conditions at election time. We believe that these empirical results speak to the current debate on IMF conditionality and contribute to the broader literature on the role and functioning of international institutions in the global economy.
|Date of creation:||16 Oct 2003|
|Date of revision:||08 Jan 2004|
|Note:||Type of Document - . Leitner Working Paper 2003-04, The Leitner Program in International Political Economy, Yale University|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
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