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Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?

  • Axel Dreher

    ()

  • Jan-Egbert Sturm

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9750-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 151 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 363-397

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:1:p:363-397
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  9. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani, 2005. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics," FMG Discussion Papers dp535, Financial Markets Group.
  10. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis�," TWI Research Paper Series 13, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universit�t Konstanz.
  11. William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett, 1989. "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 79-86, October.
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  13. Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1998. "Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 149-75, April.
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  16. Holcombe, Randall G & Sobel, Russell S, 1996. "The Stability of International Coalitions in United Nations Voting from 1946 to 1973," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(1-2), pages 17-34, January.
  17. Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Competing models of international lending activity," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 225-245, March.
  18. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
  19. Fleck, Robert K. & Kilby, Christopher & Fleck, Robert K., 2001. "World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of U.S. Influence," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 53, Vassar College Department of Economics.
  20. Dreher, Axel & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer, 2006. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Kiel Working Papers 1275, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  21. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
  22. Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2010. "Reputation concerns in aid conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 433-459, December.
  23. Shiou Shieh & Wan-Hsiang Pan, 2010. "Individual campaign contributions in a Downsian model: expressive and instrumental motives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 405-416, December.
  24. Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 105-124, July.
  25. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-84, October.
  26. Voeten, Erik, 2000. "Clashes in the Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(02), pages 185-215, March.
  27. Spindler, Zane A, 1995. "The Public Choice of "Superior" Sanctions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 205-26, December.
  28. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Working Paper Series 1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  29. Christopher Kilby, 2009. "Donor influence in international financial institutions: Deciphering what alignment measures measure," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 8, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
  30. Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 245-268, September.
  31. Martin Steinwand & Randall Stone, 2008. "The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 123-149, June.
  32. James Vreeland, 2006. "IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 359-378, December.
  33. P. Lundborg, 1998. "Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 127-142, 07.
  34. Kilby, Christopher, 2005. "Donor Influence in MDBs: the Case of the Asian Development Bank," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 70, Vassar College Department of Economics.
  35. Roland Vaubel, 2006. "Principal-agent problems in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 125-138, June.
  36. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
  37. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  38. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  39. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2007. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," KOF Working papers 07-171, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  40. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "Which Variables Explain Decisions On Imf Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 177-213, 07.
  41. Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck & Harr, Thomas & Tarp, Finn, 2006. "On US politics and IMF lending," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1843-1862, October.
  42. J. Broz, 2008. "Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 351-374, December.
  43. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
  44. Christian Bjørnskov, 2005. "Does Political Ideology Affect Economic Growth?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 133-146, April.
  45. Kim, Soo Yeon & Russett, Bruce, 1996. "The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(04), pages 629-652, September.
  46. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2001. "IMF lending: how is it affected by economic, political and institutional factors?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 243-270.
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