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Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions

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  • J. Broz

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Suggested Citation

  • J. Broz, 2008. "Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 351-374, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:351-374
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-008-9047-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-1187, December.
    2. Broz, J. Lawrence & Hawes, Michael Brewster, 2006. "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(02), pages 367-399, April.
    3. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 1993. "Official Credits to Developing Countries: Implicit Transfers to the Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(3), pages 430-444, August.
    4. Jonathan E. Haskel & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2003. "Have Falling Tariffs and Transportation Costs Raised US Wage Inequality?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 630-650, September.
    5. Alan B. Krueger, 1996. "Observations on International Labor Standards and Trade," NBER Working Papers 5632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-373, October.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    8. Tomz, Michael & Wittenberg, Jason & King, Gary, 2003. "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 8(i01).
    9. Bird, Graham, 1996. "The International Monetary Fund and developing countries: a review of the evidence and policy options," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 477-511, June.
    10. Jagdish Bhagwati, 2002. "The Wind of the Hundred Days: How Washington Mismanaged Globalization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262523272, January.
    11. repec:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:01:p:89-106_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Kevin O'Rourke, 2003. "Heckscher-Ohlin Theory and Individual Attitudes Towards Globalization," NBER Working Papers 9872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Scheve, Kenneth F. & Slaughter, Matthew J., 2001. "What determines individual trade-policy preferences?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 267-292, August.
    14. Robert E. Baldwin & Christopher S. Magee, 2000. "Congressional Trade Votes: From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track Defeat," Peterson Institute Press: Policy Analyses in International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa59, October.
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    16. Michael D. Bordo & Harold James, 2000. "The International Monetary Fund: Its Present Role in Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 7724, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Gould, Erica R., 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 551-586, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:got:cegedp:123 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Axel Dreher & James Raymond Vreeland, 2011. "Buying Votes and International Organizations," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 78, Courant Research Centre PEG.
    3. J. Broz, 2011. "The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 341-368, September.
    4. Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 245-268, September.
    5. Axel Dreher & Katharina Richert, 2017. "The Political Economy of International Finance Corporation Lending," CESifo Working Paper Series 6661, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Bernhard Boockmann & Axel Dreher, 2011. "Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 443-467, March.
    7. Helen Milner & Dustin Tingley, 2013. "The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 313-341, September.
    8. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    10. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    11. J. Broz, 2012. "Kathryn C. Lavelle. 2011. Legislating International Organization: The US Congress, the IMF, and the World Bank (New York, NY: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 335-338, September.
    12. Mark Copelovitch, 2014. "Michael Breen. 2013. The politics of IMF lending (New York: Palgrave MacMillan)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 125-130, March.
    13. Strand, Jonathan R. & Zappile, Tina M., 2015. "Always Vote for Principle, Though You May Vote Alone: Explaining United States Political Support for Multilateral Development Loans," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 224-239.
    14. Martin Edwards, 2009. "Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 185-209, June.
    15. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Monetary Fund; World Bank; Multilateral development banks; International financial institutions; United States Congress; F33; F42; F53; F55; F59;

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

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