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Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street

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  • Michael Dorsch

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Abstract

This paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the United States. The paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics. District heterogeneity implies district-specific electoral constraints on legislators’ ability to collect rents from, and cast dissonant votes in support of, special interests. An empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal, using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables. The empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias, using valid instruments, and considers several intuitive sub-sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue. The paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Dorsch, 2013. "Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 211-228, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:211-228
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0470-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Philipp an de Meulen & Christian Bredemeier, 2012. "A Political Winner’s Curse: Why Preventive Policies Pass Parliament so Narrowly," Ruhr Economic Papers 0336, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    3. repec:zbw:rwirep:0336 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Edward Stringham, 2014. "It’s not me, it’s you: the functioning of Wall Street during the 2008 economic downturn," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 269-288, December.
    5. Ulrich Matter & Michaela Slotwinski, 2016. "Precise Control over Legislative Vote Outcomes: A Forensic Approach to Political Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series 6007, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. an de Meulen, Philipp & Bredemeier, Christian, 2012. "A Political Winner's Curse: Why Preventive Policies Pass Parliament so Narrowly," Ruhr Economic Papers 336, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.

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