Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
This paper treats the market for special-interest campaign contributions and political "favors" as a simple asset market. The model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables: the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives, the monetary value of the favors he has promised, and his probability of winning. Using data on open-seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives, the author confronts the model with a series of tests. Despite the starkness of the model, the results of these tests are highly supportive. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.
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