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Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?

  • Stephen Ansolabehere
  • John M. de Figueiredo
  • James M. Snyder Jr

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/089533003321164976
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Pages: 105-130

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:17:y:2003:i:1:p:105-130
Note: DOI: 10.1257/089533003321164976
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
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  1. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  2. Baron, David P, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February.
  3. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  4. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
  5. Marks, Stephen V, 1993. " Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 21-42, January.
  6. Gregory M. Saltzman, 1987. "Congressional voting on labor issues: The role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 40(2), pages 163-179, January.
  7. Coughlin, Cletus C, 1985. "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 437-48, July.
  8. Shogren, Jason F. & Durden, G. C. & Silberman, J., 1991. "Effect of Interest Group Pressure on Coal Strip Mining Legislation (The)," Staff General Research Papers 357, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Milyo Jeffrey & Primo David & Groseclose Timothy, 2000. "Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-15, April.
  10. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
  11. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-98, August.
  12. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
  13. Vesenka, Mary H., 1989. "Economic interests and ideological conviction : A note on PACs and agricultural acts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 259-263, October.
  14. Kau, James B & Keenan, Donald & Rubin, Paul H, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 271-93, May.
  15. Silberman, Jonathan I & Durden, Garey C, 1976. "Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 317-29, April.
  16. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-50, October.
  17. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
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