IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v86y1996i3p425-41.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology

Author

Listed:
  • Levitt, Steven D

Abstract

This paper develops a methodology for consistently estimating the relative weights in senator utility functions, despite the fact that senator ideologies are unobserved. The empirical results suggest that voter preferences are assigned only one quarter of the weight in senator utility functions. The national 'party line' also has some influence but the senator's own ideology is the primary determinant of roll-call voting patterns. These results cast doubt on the empirical relevance of the median voter theorem. Estimation of the model requires only roll-call voting data, making it widely applicable. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Levitt, Steven D, 1996. "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 425-441, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:3:p:425-41
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199606%2986%3A3%3C425%3AHDSVDT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1992. "On the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 280-305, April.
    3. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1993. "Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 230-255, October.
    4. J. P. Nieuwenhuysen, 1977. "Comment," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 1(53), pages 73-75, January.
    5. Akira Konakayama & Toshihide Mitsui & Shinichi Watanabe, 1986. "Efficient Contracting with Reliance and a Damage Measure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 450-457.
    6. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Lars Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1993. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice with Nonbinding Contracts," Game Theory and Information 9310001, EconWPA, revised 13 Oct 1993.
    8. William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 39-53.
    9. D. H. Whitehead, 1977. "Comment," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 1(56), pages 35-38, October.
    10. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    11. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
    12. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    13. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn.
    14. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-206, Fall.
    15. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1281-1302.
    16. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 811-837.
    17. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-282, March.
    18. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    19. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 157-180.
    20. J. O. N. Perkins, 1977. "Comment," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 1(56), pages 35-35, October.
    21. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    22. Aghion, P. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1990. "On renegotiation design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 322-329, May.
    23. Tai-Yeong Chung, 1991. "Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(5), pages 1031-1042.
    24. J. H. K. Brunner, 1977. "Comment," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 1(56), pages 34-35, October.
    25. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 478-501.
    26. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 168-185.
    27. Stole, Lars A, 1992. "The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 582-606, October.
    28. D. W. Stammer, 1977. "Comment," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 1(53), pages 12-14, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:3:p:425-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.