Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.018
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- Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 587-611, August.
- Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," NBER Working Papers 13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," Working Paper series 21_07, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
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More about this item
Keywords
Lobbying; Special interest politics; Campaign financing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Statistics
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